3.7 LOW
- CVSS version (CVSS): 3.1
- Attack Vector (AV): Network (N)
- Attack Complexity (AC): High (H)
- Privileges Required (PR): None (N)
- User Interaction (UI): None (N)
- Scope (S): Unchanged (U)
- Confidentiality (C): None (N)
- Integrity (I): None (N)
- Availability (A): Low (L)
- Modified Attack Vector (MAV): Network (N)
- Modified Attack Complexity (MAC): High (H)
- Modified Privileges Required (MPR): None (N)
- Modified User Interaction (MUI): None (N)
- Modified Confidentiality (MC): None (N)
- Modified Scope (MS): Unchanged (U)
- Modified Integrity (MI): None (N)
- Modified Availability (MA): Low (L)
Activity log
- Created & dismissed (no matching packages found) suggestion
Nimiq: Out-of-bounds panic in KeyNibbles::Add from oversized child suffix in a deserialized proof
Nimiq is a Rust implementation of the Nimiq Proof-of-Stake protocol based on the Albatross consensus algorithm. Prior to 1.6.0, a malicious state-sync peer can crash a syncing node by sending a crafted TrieChunk whose proof contains a TrieNodeChild suffix that is individually valid but exceeds the 63-byte KeyNibbles backing array when combined with the parent key. KeyNibbles::Add in primitives/src/key_nibbles.rs performs the combined slice operation without checking the total length, and the input reaches put_chunk, TrieNodeChild::key, and TrieNodeChild::is_stump before proof.verify, so the attacker does not need a valid cryptographic proof. Exploitation requires the attacker to be selected as the victim's sync peer during state sync. The resulting out-of-bounds panic is transient because the node restarts and resynchronizes. This issue is fixed in version 1.6.0.
References
-
https://github.com/nimiq/core-rs-albatross/pull/3790 x_refsource_MISC
-
https://github.com/nimiq/core-rs-albatross/releases/tag/v1.6.0 x_refsource_MISC
Affected products
- ==< 1.6.0