9.3 CRITICAL
- CVSS version (CVSS): 4.0
- Attack Vector (AV): Network (N)
- Attack Complexity (AC): Low (L)
- Attack Requirement (AT): None (N)
- Privileges Required (PR): None (N)
- User Interaction (UI): None (N)
- Vulnerable System Impact Confidentiality (VC): None (N)
- Vulnerable System Impact Integrity (VI): High (H)
- Vulnerable System Impact Availability (VA): High (H)
- Subsequent System Impact Confidentiality (SC): None (N)
- Subsequent System Impact Integrity (SI): High (H)
- Subsequent System Impact Availability (SA): High (H)
- Modified Attack Vector (MAV): Network (N)
- Modified Attack Complexity (MAC): Low (L)
- Modified Attack Requirement (MAT): None (N)
- Modified Privileges Required (MPR): None (N)
- Modified User Interaction (MUI): None (N)
- Modified Vulnerable System Impact Confidentiality (MVC): None (N)
- Modified Vulnerable System Impact Integrity (MVI): High (H)
- Modified Vulnerable System Impact Availability (MVA): High (H)
- Modified Subsequent System Impact Confidentiality (MSC): Negligible (N)
- Modified Subsequent System Impact Integrity (MSI): High (H)
- Modified Subsequent System Impact Availability (MSA): High (H)
- Safety (S): Not Defined (X)
- Automatable (AU): Not Defined (X)
- Recovery (R): Not Defined (X)
- Value Density (V): Not Defined (X)
- Vulnerability Response Effort (RE): Not Defined (X)
- Provider Urgency (U): Not Defined (X)
- Confidentiality Req. (CR): Not Defined (X)
- Integrity Req. (IR): Not Defined (X)
- Availability Req. (AR): Not Defined (X)
- Exploit Maturity (E): Not Defined (X)
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ZEBRA: Consensus Divergence in Transparent Sighash Hash-Type Handling
ZEBRA is a Zcash node written entirely in Rust. Prior to zebrad version 4.3.1 and prior to zebra-script version 5.0.2, after a refactoring, Zebra failed to validate a consensus rule that restricted the possible values of sighash hash types for V5 transactions which were enabled in the NU5 network upgrade. Zebra nodes could thus accept and eventually mine a block that would be considered invalid by zcashd nodes, creating a consensus split between Zebra and zcashd nodes. In a similar vein, for V4 transactions, Zebra mistakenly used the "canonical" hash type when computing the sighash while zcashd (correctly per the spec) uses the raw value, which could also crate a consensus split. This issue has been patched in zebrad version 4.3.1 and zebra-script version 5.0.2.
References
-
https://github.com/ZcashFoundation/zebra/security/advisories/GHSA-8m29-fpq5-89jj x_refsource_CONFIRM
Affected products
- ==zebra-script < 5.0.2
- ==zebrad < 4.3.1