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Permalink CVE-2026-49147
7.5 HIGH
  • CVSS version (CVSS): 3.1
  • Attack Vector (AV): Network (N)
  • Attack Complexity (AC): Low (L)
  • Privileges Required (PR): None (N)
  • User Interaction (UI): None (N)
  • Scope (S): Unchanged (U)
  • Confidentiality (C): None (N)
  • Integrity (I): None (N)
  • Availability (A): High (H)
  • Modified Attack Vector (MAV): Network (N)
  • Modified Attack Complexity (MAC): Low (L)
  • Modified Privileges Required (MPR): None (N)
  • Modified User Interaction (MUI): None (N)
  • Modified Confidentiality (MC): None (N)
  • Modified Scope (MS): Unchanged (U)
  • Modified Integrity (MI): None (N)
  • Modified Availability (MA): High (H)
created 1 week ago Activity log
  • Created & dismissed (max. allowed matches exceeded) suggestion
App::Ack versions through 3.10.0 for Perl print unsanitised terminal escape sequences from filenames in several output modes

App::Ack versions through 3.10.0 for Perl print unsanitised terminal escape sequences from filenames in several output modes. When ack prints a filename whose basename contains terminal control bytes such as ANSI escape sequences, those bytes reach the terminal unchanged. Version 3.10.0 added a _safe_filename helper that sanitises the filenames printed by -f, -g, the colored match heading, and per-match lines, but the --show-types, -l/-L, and -c paths still emit the raw filename. A file whose name embeds cursor-movement or color escapes can overwrite or recolor earlier terminal output, or be passed unchanged to a downstream consumer.

Affected products

ack
  • =<3.10.0