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Permalink CVE-2026-52841
3.1 LOW
  • CVSS version (CVSS): 3.1
  • Attack Vector (AV): Network (N)
  • Attack Complexity (AC): High (H)
  • Privileges Required (PR): High (H)
  • User Interaction (UI): Required (R)
  • Scope (S): Unchanged (U)
  • Confidentiality (C): Low (L)
  • Integrity (I): Low (L)
  • Availability (A): None (N)
  • Modified Attack Vector (MAV): Network (N)
  • Modified Attack Complexity (MAC): High (H)
  • Modified Privileges Required (MPR): High (H)
  • Modified User Interaction (MUI): Required (R)
  • Modified Confidentiality (MC): Low (L)
  • Modified Scope (MS): Unchanged (U)
  • Modified Integrity (MI): Low (L)
  • Modified Availability (MA): None (N)
created 1 day, 2 hours ago Activity log
  • Created & dismissed (no matching packages found) suggestion
Easy!Appointments: Authorization bypass in Google OAuth provider binding lets any backend user rebind a peer provider's Google sync

Easy!Appointments is a self hosted appointment scheduler. In versions prior to 1.6.0, `Google::oauth` at `application/controllers/Google.php:278` stores its URL-supplied `provider_id` in the session, and `oauth_callback` saves the issued Google OAuth token against that row without checking the caller owns the provider. Any logged-in backend user (admin, provider, or secretary) rebinds a peer provider's Google sync to a Google account they control. The peer's appointments then sync into the attacker's calendar with each customer's name and email attached as attendee data. Version 1.6.0 patches the issue.

Affected products

easyappointments
  • ==< 1.6.0