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Permalink CVE-2026-18220
7.8 HIGH
  • CVSS version (CVSS): 3.1
  • Attack Vector (AV): Local (L)
  • Attack Complexity (AC): Low (L)
  • Privileges Required (PR): None (N)
  • User Interaction (UI): Required (R)
  • Scope (S): Unchanged (U)
  • Confidentiality (C): High (H)
  • Integrity (I): High (H)
  • Availability (A): High (H)
  • Modified Attack Vector (MAV): Local (L)
  • Modified Attack Complexity (MAC): Low (L)
  • Modified Privileges Required (MPR): None (N)
  • Modified User Interaction (MUI): Required (R)
  • Modified Confidentiality (MC): High (H)
  • Modified Scope (MS): Unchanged (U)
  • Modified Integrity (MI): High (H)
  • Modified Availability (MA): High (H)
created 1 month ago Activity log
  • Created & dismissed (max. allowed matches exceeded) suggestion
Binutils: binutils: out-of-bounds write in bfd dlx elf backend relocation processing

An out-of-bounds write vulnerability was found in the BFD library's DLX ELF backend (bfd/elf32-dlx.c) in GNU binutils. The dlx_rtype_to_howto() function maps ELF relocation types to internal howto structures but fails to perform adequate bounds checking on attacker-controlled relocation type values (via ELF32_R_TYPE(r_info)) before indexing into the dlx_elf_howto_table[] array. The DLX relocation type number space is non-contiguous (basic types 0-6, extended types at 0x10000+), but the default case in the switch statement allows arbitrary index values to reach the array access. A specially crafted ELF/DLX object file can trigger this out-of-bounds write when processed by any BFD-consuming tool (objdump, readelf, strip, ld, nm, objcopy). The vulnerability has been demonstrated to achieve arbitrary code execution via a File Stream Oriented Programming (FSOP) attack against glibc FILE structures (stderr), redirecting control flow to system(). Attack scenarios include CI/CD pipelines performing automated binary analysis, developer workstations running objdump/readelf on untrusted binaries, automated security scanning or malware analysis tools invoking binutils, and package build systems processing third-party code. Note: This vulnerability is only exploitable when binutils is built with the DLX backend enabled (typically via --enable-targets=all).

References

Affected products

gdb
rhcos
binutils
mingw-binutils
gcc-toolset-14-gdb
gcc-toolset-15-gdb
gcc-toolset-14-binutils
gcc-toolset-15-binutils
gcc-toolset-16-binutils