Nixpkgs security tracker

Login with GitHub
⚠️ You are using a production deployment that is still only suitable for demo purposes. Any work done in this might be wiped later without notice.

Suggestion detail

Dismissed
(no matching packages found)
Permalink CVE-2026-55825
3.1 LOW
  • CVSS version (CVSS): 3.1
  • Attack Vector (AV): Network (N)
  • Attack Complexity (AC): High (H)
  • Privileges Required (PR): Low (L)
  • User Interaction (UI): None (N)
  • Scope (S): Unchanged (U)
  • Confidentiality (C): Low (L)
  • Integrity (I): None (N)
  • Availability (A): None (N)
  • Modified Attack Vector (MAV): Network (N)
  • Modified Attack Complexity (MAC): High (H)
  • Modified Privileges Required (MPR): Low (L)
  • Modified User Interaction (MUI): None (N)
  • Modified Confidentiality (MC): Low (L)
  • Modified Scope (MS): Unchanged (U)
  • Modified Integrity (MI): None (N)
  • Modified Availability (MA): None (N)
created 1 month ago Activity log
  • Created & dismissed (no matching packages found) suggestion
Contao: Possible path traversal in job download URIs

Contao is an Open Source CMS. In versions 5.7.0 through 5.7.6, an authenticated backend user who can access one job can request an attachment identifier containing ../ segments and make the job attachment download endpoint read a file from another job directory inside var/job-attachments. The controller authorizes only the jobUuid route parameter. The later attachment lookup joins that authorized job UUID with the attacker-controlled identifier, then passes the combined path to the virtual filesystem. VirtualFilesystem::resolve() canonicalizes the whole path and only rejects paths that escape the filesystem mount, so authorized-job/../victim-job/debug_log.csv becomes victim-job/debug_log.csv. This is a cross-job authorization bypass for known job attachment paths. It is not a practical brute-force against unknown jobs because job directories are UUID v4 values.

Affected products

contao
  • ==>= 5.7.0, < 5.7.7