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Input: ims-pcu - fix heap-buffer-overflow in ims_pcu_process_data()

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Input: ims-pcu - fix heap-buffer-overflow in ims_pcu_process_data() The `ims_pcu_process_data()` processes incoming URB data byte by byte. However, it fails to check if the `read_pos` index exceeds IMS_PCU_BUF_SIZE. If a malicious USB device sends a packet larger than IMS_PCU_BUF_SIZE, `read_pos` will increment indefinitely. Moreover, since `read_pos` is located immediately after `read_buf`, the attacker can overwrite `read_pos` itself to arbitrarily control the index. This manipulated `read_pos` is subsequently used in `ims_pcu_handle_response()` to copy data into `cmd_buf`, leading to a heap buffer overflow. Specifically, an attacker can overwrite the `cmd_done.wait.head` located at offset 136 relative to `cmd_buf` in the `ims_pcu_handle_response()`. Consequently, when the driver calls `complete(&pcu->cmd_done)`, it triggers a control flow hijack by using the manipulated pointer. Fix this by adding a bounds check for `read_pos` before writing to `read_buf`. If the packet is too long, discard it, log a warning, and reset the parser state. [dtor: factor out resetting packet state, reset checksum as well]

Affected products

Linux
  • =<6.6.*
  • <875115b82c295277b81b6dfee7debc725f44e854
  • =<*
  • <ca9f8c09845fb8c51b6d447f6428eecd1b8b0a49
  • <d03a740e087de7dcb2a26dc1123377bd3d1d84ca
  • =<6.18.*
  • ==3.10
  • <3.10
  • <40bbbf2e91fd60715525bf0405c67876af817edf
  • =<6.12.*