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Permalink CVE-2026-55739
8.3 HIGH
  • CVSS version (CVSS): 3.1
  • Attack Vector (AV): Network (N)
  • Attack Complexity (AC): Low (L)
  • Privileges Required (PR): Low (L)
  • User Interaction (UI): None (N)
  • Scope (S): Unchanged (U)
  • Confidentiality (C): High (H)
  • Integrity (I): High (H)
  • Availability (A): Low (L)
  • Modified Attack Vector (MAV): Network (N)
  • Modified Attack Complexity (MAC): Low (L)
  • Modified Privileges Required (MPR): Low (L)
  • Modified User Interaction (MUI): None (N)
  • Modified Confidentiality (MC): High (H)
  • Modified Scope (MS): Unchanged (U)
  • Modified Integrity (MI): High (H)
  • Modified Availability (MA): Low (L)
created 1 month ago Activity log
  • Created & dismissed (no matching packages found) suggestion
Crater: Missing Tenant-Ownership Check in CustomerPolicy Allows Cross-Company Customer Data Theft and Deletion

Crater isolates data per company_id, and its Invoice/Estimate/Payment/Expense policies enforce both a Bouncer ability check and $user->hasCompany($model->company_id). CustomerPolicy's view/update/delete methods omit the company-ownership check entirely, checking only the blanket ability. Route-model-bound customer lookups and the bulk Customer::deleteCustomers() method are similarly unscoped (self::find($id) with no company filter). Any authenticated user of one company can read, reassign (steal), or delete another company's customer records, with deletion cascading to that customer's invoices and payments.

Affected products

Crater
  • ==6.0.6