Apache Airflow 3.3.0 moved human-in-the-loop tasks from the triggerer to a new `awaiting_input` task state swept by the scheduler. That sweep deserializes the task instance's `next_kwargs` without an allow-list, so a Dag author — who controls that value through the task execution API — can cause an arbitrary module import and object instantiation inside the scheduler process, or terminate the scheduler job. No non-default configuration is required: the sweep runs unconditionally every 15 seconds, and the default `allowed_deserialization_classes` setting does not cover this code path. Versions before 3.3.0 are not affected, because human-in-the-loop tasks deferred onto the triggerer instead. This is a different code path from CVE-2026-58076, which covers the same unguarded exception-node deserialization reached elsewhere — deployments that applied that fix must upgrade for this issue as well. Users are advised to upgrade to apache-airflow 3.3.1 or later.

Apache Airflow wrote Variable values and Connection `extra` contents to the audit log in cleartext when they were submitted through the bulk endpoints (`PATCH /api/v2/variables` and `PATCH /api/v2/connections`). The audit-log masking recognised only top-level request fields, and a bulk request nests its entities two levels below, so no masking was applied to them. Any authenticated user with audit-log read access -- who need not hold Variables or Connections read at all -- could recover those secrets verbatim, and the Connection `extra` copy is stored unencrypted in the log while the connection table encrypts it. The Airflow UI's *Import Variables* action posts to this endpoint, so an ordinary operator import wrote every secret in the file to the log. This is a different code path from CVE-2026-50204: that fix shipped in 3.3.0 and covers the single-entity endpoints only, so deployments that upgraded in response to that advisory remain affected and must upgrade again. Users are advised to upgrade to apache-airflow 3.3.1 or later.

The Config API in Apache Airflow surfaced per-key secrets-backend overrides (environment variables like `AIRFLOW__SECRETS__BACKEND_KWARG__SECRET_ID` and `AIRFLOW__WORKERS__SECRETS_BACKEND_KWARG__SECRET_ID`) as synthetic config options whose option names were not in `sensitive_config_values`, so the masker did not redact them. An authenticated UI/API user with Config read permission could retrieve plaintext secrets-backend credentials (Vault `role_id` / `secret_id`, etc.) from the Config API output. Affects deployments that configure secrets backends via per-key environment overrides. Users are advised to upgrade to `apache-airflow` 3.3.0 or later.

In Apache Airflow before 3.3.0, the REST API task-instance detail and list endpoints returned a deferred task's trigger kwargs without masking. When a deferred operator passed a secret (for example a provider API key) into its trigger, any authenticated user with DAG-scoped task-instance read access for that DAG could read that secret in clear text while the task was deferred. Users should upgrade to apache-airflow 3.3.0 or later, which masks sensitive values in trigger kwargs returned by the API.

The Bulk Variables API in Apache Airflow called the redactor without passing the variable's key, so the key-based `should_hide_value_for_key` check (which triggers on secret-suffixed key names like `*_password` / `*_token` / `*_secret`) could not fire for JSON-decodable variable values. An authenticated UI/API user with bulk Variable read permission could retrieve plaintext values from JSON variables whose key would otherwise trigger redaction. Affects deployments that store sensitive values in JSON-typed Airflow Variables under secret-suffixed key names. Users are advised to upgrade to `apache-airflow` 3.3.0 or later (the fix landed on `main` after 3.2.2; no 3.2.x backport).

Before apache-airflow 3.3.0, a user authorized to read one Dag could disclose the source of other Dags co-located in the same source file. `GET /api/v2/dagSources/{dag_id}` — and the equivalent Dag-source view in the UI — returned the entire source file without redacting Dags the caller was not authorized to read, bypassing per-DAG read authorization. Deployments that co-locate multiple Dags in a single file and rely on per-DAG access control to limit source visibility are affected; single-Dag-per-file deployments are not. Upgrade to apache-airflow 3.3.0 or later.

A bug in Apache Airflow's `/ui/dependencies` scheduling graph endpoint applied the caller's readable-Dag filter to the top-level serialized Dag key but still emitted referenced Dag IDs through the `dep.source` and `dep.target` fields of trigger / sensor dependency entries. An authenticated UI user with read permission on some Dags could enumerate the identifiers of other Dags they were not authorized to read by inspecting the dependency graph for trigger / sensor references. Affects deployments that rely on per-Dag read scoping to keep Dag identifiers private across teams. This is a residual gap in the fix for CVE-2026-28563, which filtered the top-level Dag key but did not propagate the filter into the trigger / sensor dep-source / dep-target fields. Users who already upgraded for CVE-2026-28563 should additionally upgrade to `apache-airflow` 3.3.0 or later to cover the residual trigger / sensor dependency leak.

A bug in `BaseSerialization.deserialize()` allowed unrestricted `import_string()` of attacker-controlled class paths when the Scheduler / API Server loaded a serialized DAG: a DAG author could embed a malicious trigger into a DAG to gain remote code execution on the API Server / Scheduler process, crossing the Airflow security boundary that DAG-author code must never execute in those processes. Users are advised to upgrade to `apache-airflow` 3.3.0 or later. As a defense-in-depth mitigation, deployments where DAG-author trust is limited can restrict the `[core] allowed_deserialization_classes` config to a narrow allowlist.

Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor vulnerability in Apache Airflow.This issue affects Apache Airflow from 2.4.0 to 2.7.0. Sensitive configuration information has been exposed to authenticated users with the ability to read configuration via Airflow REST API for configuration even when the expose_config option is set to non-sensitive-only. The expose_config option is False by default. It is recommended to upgrade to a version that is not affected if you set expose_config to non-sensitive-only configuration. This is a different error than CVE-2023-45348 which allows authenticated user to retrieve individual configuration values in 2.7.* by specially crafting their request (solved in 2.7.2). Users are recommended to upgrade to version 2.7.2, which fixes the issue and additionally fixes CVE-2023-45348.