Flare is a Next.js-based, self-hostable file sharing platform that integrates with screenshot tools. Prior to 1.7.3, an authenticated path traversal vulnerability in /api/avatars/[filename] allows any logged-in user to read arbitrary files from within the application container. The filename URL parameter is passed to path.join() without sanitization, and getFileStream() performs no path validation, enabling %2F-encoded ../ sequences to escape the uploads/avatars/ directory and read any file accessible to the nextjs process under /app/. Authentication is enforced by Next.js middleware. However, on instances with open registration enabled (the default), any attacker can self-register and immediately exploit this. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.7.3.

Flare is a Next.js-based, self-hostable file sharing platform that integrates with screenshot tools. Prior to version 1.7.2, the raw and direct file routes only block unauthenticated users from accessing private files. Any authenticated, non‑owner user who knows the file URL can retrieve the content, which is inconsistent with stricter checks used by other endpoints. This issue has been patched in version 1.7.2.

Flare is a Next.js-based, self-hostable file sharing platform that integrates with screenshot tools. Prior to version 1.7.2, the thumbnail endpoint does not validate the password for password‑protected files. It checks ownership/admin for private files but skips password verification, allowing thumbnail access without the password. This issue has been patched in version 1.7.2.

A vulnerability has been discovered in cloudflared's installer (<= 2023.3.0) for Windows 32-bits devices that allows a local attacker with no administrative permissions to escalate their privileges on the affected device. This vulnerability exists because the MSI installer used by cloudflared relied on a world-writable directory. An attacker with local access to the device (without Administrator rights) can use symbolic links to trick the MSI installer into deleting files in locations that the attacker would otherwise have no access to. By creating a symlink from the world-writable directory to the target file, the attacker can manipulate the MSI installer's repair functionality to delete the target file during the repair process. Exploitation of this vulnerability could allow an attacker to delete important system files or replace them with malicious files, potentially leading to the affected device being compromised. The cloudflared client itself is not affected by this vulnerability, only the installer for 32-bit Windows devices.