CVE-2025-40843 https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-5xf2-f6ch-6p8r  was fixed by replacing unchecked strcpy() with a bounded safe_strcpy() helper. At ldlogger-tool-gcc.c:129 the destination passed to that helper is fullPath + 2, but the size passed down is the full PATH_MAX. safe_strcpy() is strncpy(), which NUL-pads the destination out to the whole n, so this site writes 4096 bytes into the 4094 that remain — a 2-byte stack overflow on every invocation, independent of the input path's length. This issue affects CodeChecker: through 6.28.2.

CodeChecker's massStoreRun processing path performs one-shot decompression of attacker-controlled, Base64-encoded zlib data without enforcing a maximum decompressed size. An authenticated user with permission to store analysis runs can submit a highly compressed payload that expands to a significantly larger byte sequence. Because the entire decompressed output is materialized in memory before being written to a temporary file, a sufficiently large payload may exhaust process or host memory and consume substantial disk space, resulting in denial of service.

The personal access token removal query selects from PersonalAccessTokenDB but filters on columns of Session, with no join between them. SQLAlchemy resolves that as an implicit cross join, so the filter does not constrain the delete to the calling user's own token in the way the code reads as intending. This way a user can delete all personal access tokens in the system.