Classic buffer overflow in the Erlang/OTP megaco flex scanner C driver allows a remote unauthenticated attacker to corrupt the driver's memory (and potentially achieve remote code execution or a denial-of-service crash) by sending a single text-encoded H.248/Megaco message containing an oversized property parm name. When tokenizing a Local/Remote descriptor, mfs_load_property_groups extracts the attacker-controlled property name (bounded only by the message length) and, when no value follows, formats it into a fixed 512-byte error_msg field of the MfsErlDrvData struct using an unchecked sprintf call. Names longer than roughly 452 bytes overflow into the immediately following struct fields (text_buf, text_ptr, term_spec, term_spec_size, term_spec_index), overwriting live pointers and counters with attacker-chosen bytes. Subsequent scanner code writes and frees through the corrupted pointers, producing arbitrary write and arbitrary free primitives inside the BEAM VM process, which can be leveraged for remote code execution. On builds compiled with _FORTIFY_SOURCE the overflow is detected at runtime and terminates the process with SIGABRT, resulting in denial of service. The overflow occurs in the flex scanner before any grammar or Megaco-level authentication processing, so exploitation requires only network reachability to the megaco transport port on a node configured with {scanner, flex}. This vulnerability is associated with program files lib/megaco/src/flex/megaco_flex_scanner_drv.flex.src and program routines mfs_load_property_groups. This issue affects OTP from OTP 17.0 before OTP 29.0.4, OTP 28.5.0.4 and OTP 27.3.4.15, corresponding to megaco from 3.17.1 before 4.9.1, 4.8.3.1 and 4.7.2.2. Versions prior to OTP 17.0 are also affected but are not listed because the OTP version scheme is only defined from OTP 17.0 onwards.

Allocation of resources without limits in Erlang/OTP public_key certificate path validation allows a remote unauthenticated attacker to cause denial of service by sending a crafted X.509 certificate chain during the TLS handshake. During RFC 5280 policy processing in public_key:pkix_path_validation/3, the certificate policy tree maintained by pubkey_policy_tree grows without an upper bound. When a certificate chain contains M policies per certificate and K certificates, the tree grows on the order of M^K nodes because pubkey_policy_tree:add_leaves/2 and pubkey_policy_tree:add_leaf_siblings/2 extend the tree per policy per certificate. A modest chain with many policies per certificate is enough to pin BEAM schedulers and exhaust the node's memory, taking down the entire VM. The attacker only needs to be able to present a certificate chain to the victim, which is the normal precondition for a TLS handshake, so exploitation succeeds against any incoming or outgoing TLS connection that validates the peer's chain (the default for SSL/TLS clients and mutual-TLS servers). This is the same vulnerability class as OpenSSL's X509_verify_cert policy tree DoS. This vulnerability is associated with program files lib/public_key/src/pubkey_policy_tree.erl and program routines pubkey_policy_tree:add_leaves/2 and pubkey_policy_tree:add_leaf_siblings/2. This issue affects OTP from OTP 26.2 before OTP 29.0.4, OTP 28.5.0.4 and OTP 27.3.4.15, corresponding to public_key from 1.15 before 1.21.4, 1.20.3.4 and 1.17.1.5.