OpenEXR provides the specification and reference implementation of the EXR file format, an image storage format for the motion picture industry. From 3.1.0 to before 3.2.7, 3.3.9, and 3.4.9, internal_exr_undo_piz() advances the working wavelet pointer with signed 32-bit arithmetic. Because nx, ny, and wcount are int, a crafted EXR file can make this product overflow and wrap. The next channel then decodes from an incorrect address. The wavelet decode path operates in place, so this yields both out-of-bounds reads and out-of-bounds writes. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.2.7, 3.3.9, and 3.4.9.

OpenEXR provides the specification and reference implementation of the EXR file format, an image storage format for the motion picture industry. From 3.2.0 to before 3.2.7, 3.3.9, and 3.4.9, a misaligned memory write vulnerability exists in LossyDctDecoder_execute() in src/lib/OpenEXRCore/internal_dwa_decoder.h:749. When decoding a DWA or DWAB-compressed EXR file containing a FLOAT-type channel, the decoder performs an in-place HALF→FLOAT conversion by casting an unaligned uint8_t * row pointer to float * and writing through it. Because the row buffer may not be 4-byte aligned, this constitutes undefined behavior under the C standard and crashes immediately on architectures that enforce alignment (ARM, RISC-V, etc.). On x86 it is silently tolerated at runtime but remains exploitable via compiler optimizations that assume aligned access. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.2.7, 3.3.9, and 3.4.9.

OpenEXR provides the specification and reference implementation of the EXR file format, an image storage format for the motion picture industry. From 3.2.0 to before 3.2.7, 3.3.9, and 3.4.9, a signed integer overflow exists in undo_pxr24_impl() in src/lib/OpenEXRCore/internal_pxr24.c at line 377. The expression (uint64_t)(w * 3) computes w * 3 as a signed 32-bit integer before casting to uint64_t. When w is large, this multiplication constitutes undefined behavior under the C standard. On tested builds (clang/gcc without sanitizers), two's-complement wraparound commonly occurs, and for specific values of w the wrapped result is a small positive integer, which may allow the subsequent bounds check to pass incorrectly. If the check is bypassed, the decoding loop proceeds to write pixel data through dout, potentially extending far beyond the allocated output buffer. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.2.7, 3.3.9, and 3.4.9.

OpenEXR provides the specification and reference implementation of the EXR file format, an image storage format for the motion picture industry. From 3.2.0 to before 3.2.7, 3.3.9, and 3.4.9, the DWA lossy decoder constructs temporary per-component block pointers using signed 32-bit arithmetic. For a large enough width, the calculation overflows and later decoder stores operate on a wrapped pointer outside the allocated rowBlock backing store. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.2.7, 3.3.9, and 3.4.9.

OpenEXR provides the specification and reference implementation of the EXR file format, an image storage format for the motion picture industry. From 3.4.0 to before 3.4.9, a missing bounds check on the dataWindow attribute in EXR file headers allows an attacker to trigger a signed integer overflow in generic_unpack(). By setting dataWindow.min.x to a large negative value, OpenEXRCore computes an enormous image width, which is later used in a signed integer multiplication that overflows, causing the process to terminate with SIGILL via UBSan. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.4.9.

OpenEXR provides the specification and reference implementation of the EXR file format, an image storage format for the motion picture industry. From version 3.4.0 to before version 3.4.7, an attacker providing a crafted .exr file with HTJ2K compression and a channel width of 32768 can write controlled data beyond the output heap buffer in any application that decodes EXR images. The write primitive is 2 bytes per overflow iteration or 4 bytes (by another path), repeating for each additional pixel past the overflow point. In this context, a heap write overflow can lead to remote code execution on systems. This issue has been patched in version 3.4.7.

OpenEXR provides the specification and reference implementation of the EXR file format, an image storage format for the motion picture industry. From version 3.4.0 to before version 3.4.8, a crafted B44 or B44A EXR file can cause an out-of-bounds write in any application that decodes it via exr_decoding_run(). Consequences range from immediate crash (most likely) to corruption of adjacent heap allocations (layout-dependent). This issue has been patched in version 3.4.8.

OpenEXR provides the specification and reference implementation of the EXR file format, an image storage format for the motion picture industry. From version 3.4.0 to before version 3.4.8, sensitive information from heap memory may be leaked through the decoded pixel data (information disclosure). This occurs under default settings; simply reading a malicious EXR file is sufficient to trigger the issue, without any user interaction. This issue has been patched in version 3.4.8.

OpenEXR provides the specification and reference implementation of the EXR file format, an image storage format for the motion picture industry. In CompositeDeepScanLine::readPixels, per-pixel totals are accumulated in vector<unsigned int> total_sizes for attacker-controlled large counts across many parts, total_sizes[ptr] wraps modulo 2^32. overall_sample_count is then derived from wrapped totals and used in samples[channel].resize(overall_sample_count). Decode pointer setup/consumption proceeds with true sample counts, and write operations in core unpack (generic_unpack_deep_pointers) overrun the undersized composite sample buffer. This vulnerability is fixed in v3.2.6, v3.3.8, and v3.4.6.

OpenEXR provides the specification and reference implementation of the EXR file format, an image storage format for the motion picture industry. In versions 3.3.0 through 3.3.6 and 3.4.0 through 3.4.4, a heap-buffer-overflow (OOB read) occurs in the `istream_nonparallel_read` function in `ImfContextInit.cpp` when parsing a malformed EXR file through a memory-mapped `IStream`. A signed integer subtraction produces a negative value that is implicitly converted to `size_t`, resulting in a massive length being passed to `memcpy`. Versions 3.3.7 and 3.4.5 contain a patch.