5.3 MEDIUM
- CVSS version: 3.1
- Attack vector (AV): NETWORK
- Attack complexity (AC): LOW
- Privileges required (PR): NONE
- User interaction (UI): NONE
- Scope (S): UNCHANGED
- Confidentiality impact (C): LOW
- Integrity impact (I): NONE
- Availability impact (A): NONE
Rekor affected by Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) via provided public key URL
Rekor is a software supply chain transparency log. In versions 1.4.3 and below, attackers can trigger SSRF to arbitrary internal services because /api/v1/index/retrieve supports retrieving a public key via user-provided URL. Since the SSRF only can trigger GET requests, the request cannot mutate state. The response from the GET request is not returned to the caller so data exfiltration is not possible. A malicious actor could attempt to probe an internal network through Blind SSRF. The issue has been fixed in version 1.5.0. To workaround this issue, disable the search endpoint with --enable_retrieve_api=false.
References
-
https://github.com/sigstore/rekor/security/advisories/GHSA-4c4x-jm2x-pf9j x_refsource_CONFIRM
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https://github.com/sigstore/rekor/releases/tag/v1.5.0 x_refsource_MISC
Affected products
- ==< 1.5.0
Matching in nixpkgs
pkgs.rekor-cli
CLI client for Sigstore, the Signature Transparency Log
pkgs.rekor-server
Sigstore server, the Signature Transparency Log
pkgs.python312Packages.sigstore-rekor-types
Python models for Rekor's API types
Package maintainers
-
@fabaff Fabian Affolter <mail@fabian-affolter.ch>
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@Bot-wxt1221 Bot-wxt1221 <3264117476@qq.com>
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@06kellyjac Jack <hello+nixpkgs@j-k.io>
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@developer-guy Batuhan Apaydın <developerguyn@gmail.com>
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@LeSuisse Thomas Gerbet <thomas@gerbet.me>