Imager versions before 1.033 for Perl treat unsigned EXIF IFD entry counts as signed. Imager mishandled large EXIF IFD entry count values, treating them as negative numbers. This could lead to an attempt to allocate a block nearly the size of the address space, which fails and kills the process. An attacker could craft an image with EXIF data that terminates a worker process.

Imager versions before 1.032 for Perl have a heap out-of-bounds read in the bundled Imager::File::SGI reader via a 16-bit RLE literal run in read_rgb_16_rle. read_rgb_16_rle guards each literal run with if (count > data_left), but count is a pixel count while every 16-bit sample consumes two bytes. The copy loop reads inp[0] * 256 + inp[1] and advances two bytes per pixel, so a run with data_left / 2 < count <= data_left passes the guard yet consumes 2 * count bytes and reads past the end of the buffer. The 8-bit path is unaffected because there one pixel is one byte. Reading a crafted SGI image through Imager->read triggers the over-read before the parser rejects the malformed image, which can crash the process.