In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Fix RCU stall in bpf_fd_array_map_clear() Add a missing cond_resched() in bpf_fd_array_map_clear() loop. For PROG_ARRAY maps with many entries this loop calls prog_array_map_poke_run() per entry which can be expensive, and without yielding this can cause RCU stalls under load: rcu: Stack dump where RCU GP kthread last ran: CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 30932 Comm: kworker/0:2 Not tainted 6.14.0-13195-g967e8def1100 #2 PREEMPT(undef) Workqueue: events prog_array_map_clear_deferred RIP: 0010:write_comp_data+0x38/0x90 kernel/kcov.c:246 Call Trace: <TASK> prog_array_map_poke_run+0x77/0x380 kernel/bpf/arraymap.c:1096 __fd_array_map_delete_elem+0x197/0x310 kernel/bpf/arraymap.c:925 bpf_fd_array_map_clear kernel/bpf/arraymap.c:1000 [inline] prog_array_map_clear_deferred+0x119/0x1b0 kernel/bpf/arraymap.c:1141 process_one_work+0x898/0x19d0 kernel/workqueue.c:3238 process_scheduled_works kernel/workqueue.c:3319 [inline] worker_thread+0x770/0x10b0 kernel/workqueue.c:3400 kthread+0x465/0x880 kernel/kthread.c:464 ret_from_fork+0x4d/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:153 ret_from_fork_asm+0x19/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245 </TASK>

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/xe/dma-buf: handle empty bo and UAF races There look to be some nasty races here when triggering the invalidate_mappings hook: 1) We do xe_bo_alloc() followed by the attach, before the actual full bo init step in xe_dma_buf_init_obj(). However the bo is visible on the attachments list after the attach. This is bad since exporter driver, say amdgpu, can at any time call back into our invalidate_mappings hook, with an empty/bogus bo, leading to potential bugs/crashes. 2) Similar to 1) but here we get a UAF, when the invalidate_mappings hook is triggered. For example, we get as far as xe_bo_init_locked() but this fails in some way. But here the bo will be freed on error, but we still have it attached from dma-buf pov, so if the invalidate_mappings is now triggered then the bo we access is gone and we trigger UAF and more bugs/crashes. To fix this, move the attach step until after we actually have a fully set up buffer object. Note that the bo is not published to userspace until later, so not sure what the comment "Don't publish the bo until we have a valid attachment", is referring to. We have at least two different customers reporting hitting a NULL ptr deref in evict_flags when importing something from amdgpu, followed by triggering the evict flow. Hit rate is also pretty low, which would hint at some kind of race, so something like 1) or 2) might explain this. v2: - Shuffle the order of the ops slightly (no functional change) - Improve the comment to better explain the ordering (Matt B) (cherry picked from commit af1f2ad0c59fe4e2f924c526f66e968289d77971)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fs/ntfs3: prevent uninitialized lcn caused by zero len syzbot reported a uninit-value in ntfs_iomap_begin [1]. Since runs was not touched yet, run_lookup_entry() immediately fails and returns false, which makes the value of "*len" 0. Simultaneously, the new value and err value are also 0, causing the logic in attr_data_get_block_locked() to jump directly to ok, ultimately resulting in *lcn being triggered before it is set [1]. In ntfs_iomap_begin(), the check for a 0 value in clen is moved forward to before updating lcn to avoid this [1]. [1] BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in ntfs_iomap_begin+0x8c0/0x1460 fs/ntfs3/inode.c:825 ntfs_iomap_begin+0x8c0/0x1460 fs/ntfs3/inode.c:825 iomap_iter+0x9b7/0x1540 fs/iomap/iter.c:110 Local variable lcn created at: ntfs_iomap_begin+0x15d/0x1460 fs/ntfs3/inode.c:786

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ima_fs: Correctly create securityfs files for unsupported hash algos ima_tpm_chip->allocated_banks[i].crypto_id is initialized to HASH_ALGO__LAST if the TPM algorithm is not supported. However there are places relying on the algorithm to be valid because it is accessed by hash_algo_name[]. On 6.12.40 I observe the following read out-of-bounds in hash_algo_name: ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: global-out-of-bounds in create_securityfs_measurement_lists+0x396/0x440 Read of size 8 at addr ffffffff83e18138 by task swapper/0/1 CPU: 4 UID: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.12.40 #3 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x61/0x90 print_report+0xc4/0x580 ? kasan_addr_to_slab+0x26/0x80 ? create_securityfs_measurement_lists+0x396/0x440 kasan_report+0xc2/0x100 ? create_securityfs_measurement_lists+0x396/0x440 create_securityfs_measurement_lists+0x396/0x440 ima_fs_init+0xa3/0x300 ima_init+0x7d/0xd0 init_ima+0x28/0x100 do_one_initcall+0xa6/0x3e0 kernel_init_freeable+0x455/0x740 kernel_init+0x24/0x1d0 ret_from_fork+0x38/0x80 ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20 </TASK> The buggy address belongs to the variable: hash_algo_name+0xb8/0x420 Memory state around the buggy address: ffffffff83e18000: 00 01 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 00 01 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 ffffffff83e18080: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 >ffffffff83e18100: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 00 05 f9 f9 ^ ffffffff83e18180: f9 f9 f9 f9 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 04 f9 f9 f9 f9 ffffffff83e18200: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 04 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 ================================================================== Seems like the TPM chip supports sha3_256, which isn't yet in tpm_algorithms: tpm tpm0: TPM with unsupported bank algorithm 0x0027 That's TPM_ALG_SHA3_256 == 0x0027 from "Trusted Platform Module 2.0 Library Part 2: Structures", page 51 [1]. See also the related U-Boot algorithms update [2]. Thus solve the problem by creating a file name with "_tpm_alg_<ID>" postfix if the crypto algorithm isn't initialized. This is how it looks on the test machine (patch ported to v6.12 release): # ls -1 /sys/kernel/security/ima/ ascii_runtime_measurements ascii_runtime_measurements_tpm_alg_27 ascii_runtime_measurements_sha1 ascii_runtime_measurements_sha256 binary_runtime_measurements binary_runtime_measurements_tpm_alg_27 binary_runtime_measurements_sha1 binary_runtime_measurements_sha256 policy runtime_measurements_count violations [1]: https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/Trusted-Platform-Module-2.0-Library-Part-2-Version-184_pub.pdf [2]: https://lists.denx.de/pipermail/u-boot/2024-July/558835.html

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: dm cache: fix write hang in passthrough mode The invalidate_remove() function has incomplete logic for handling write hit bios after cache invalidation. It sets up the remapping for the overwrite_bio but then drops it immediately without submission, causing write operations to hang. Fix by adding a new invalidate_committed() continuation that submits the remapped writes to the cache origin after metadata commit completes, while using the overwrite_endio hook to ensure proper completion sequencing. This maintains existing coherency. Also improve error handling in invalidate_complete() to preserve the original error status instead of using bio_io_error() unconditionally.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: vsock/virtio: fix MSG_ZEROCOPY pinned-pages accounting virtio_transport_init_zcopy_skb() uses iter->count as the size argument for msg_zerocopy_realloc(), which in turn passes it to mm_account_pinned_pages() for RLIMIT_MEMLOCK accounting. However, this function is called after virtio_transport_fill_skb() has already consumed the iterator via __zerocopy_sg_from_iter(), so on the last skb, iter->count will be 0, skipping the RLIMIT_MEMLOCK enforcement. Pass pkt_len (the total bytes being sent) as an explicit parameter to virtio_transport_init_zcopy_skb() instead of reading the already-consumed iter->count. This matches TCP and UDP, which both call msg_zerocopy_realloc() with the original message size.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: ip6t_hbh: reject oversized option lists struct ip6t_opts stores at most IP6T_OPTS_OPTSNR option descriptors, but hbh_mt6_check() does not reject larger optsnr values supplied from userspace. Validate optsnr in the rule setup path so only match data that fits the fixed-size opts array can be installed. This follows the existing xtables pattern of rejecting invalid user-provided counts in checkentry() and keeps the packet matching path unchanged. `struct ip6t_opts` has a fixed `opts[IP6T_OPTS_OPTSNR]` array, where `IP6T_OPTS_OPTSNR` is 16, then off-by-one array access is possible: [ 137.924693][ T8692] UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in ../net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6t_hbh.c:110:29 [ 137.926167][ T8692] index 16 is out of range for type '__u16 [16]'

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: xtables: restrict several matches to inet family This is a partial revert of: commit ab4f21e6fb1c ("netfilter: xtables: use NFPROTO_UNSPEC in more extensions") to allow ipv4 and ipv6 only. - xt_mac - xt_owner - xt_physdev These extensions are not used by ebtables in userspace. Moreover, xt_realm is only for ipv4, since dst->tclassid is ipv4 specific.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: Reject wrapped offset in kvm_reset_dirty_gfn() kvm_reset_dirty_gfn() guards the gfn range with if (!memslot || (offset + __fls(mask)) >= memslot->npages) return; but offset is u64 and the addition is unchecked. The check can be silently bypassed by a u64 wrap. The dirty ring backing those entries is MAP_SHARED at KVM_DIRTY_LOG_PAGE_OFFSET of the vcpu fd, so the VMM can rewrite the slot and offset fields of any entry between when the kernel pushes them and when KVM_RESET_DIRTY_RINGS consumes them. On reset, kvm_dirty_ring_reset() re-reads the values via READ_ONCE() and feeds them straight back into this check; only the flags handshake is treated as the handover, the slot/offset payload is taken on trust. Crafting two entries entry[i].offset = 0xffffffffffffffc1 entry[i+1].offset = 0 makes the coalescing loop in kvm_dirty_ring_reset() compute delta = (s64)(0 - 0xffffffffffffffc1) = 63 which falls in [0, BITS_PER_LONG), so it folds entry[i+1] into the existing mask by setting bit 63. The trailing kvm_reset_dirty_gfn() call then sees offset = 0xffffffffffffffc1 and __fls(mask) = 63; the sum is 0 in u64 and the bounds check passes. That offset propagates into kvm_arch_mmu_enable_log_dirty_pt_masked() unchanged. On the legacy MMU path -- kvm_memslots_have_rmaps() == true, i.e. shadow paging, any VM that has allocated shadow roots, or a write-tracked slot -- it reaches gfn_to_rmap(), which indexes slot->arch.rmap[0][] with a near-U64_MAX gfn. That is an out-of-bounds load of a kvm_rmap_head, followed by a conditional clear of PT_WRITABLE_MASK in whatever the loaded pointer points at. The path is reachable from any process holding /dev/kvm. Range-check offset on its own first, so the addition cannot wrap. memslot->npages is bounded well below U64_MAX, so once offset < npages holds, offset + __fls(mask) (with __fls(mask) < BITS_PER_LONG) stays in range.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: mt76: mt7925: fix potential deadlock in mt7925_roc_abort_sync roc_abort_sync() can deadlock with roc_work(). roc_work() holds dev->mt76.mutex, while cancel_work_sync() waits for roc_work() to finish. If the caller already owns the same mutex, both sides block and no progress is possible. This deadlock can occur during station removal when mt76_sta_state() -> mt76_sta_remove() -> mt7925_mac_sta_remove_link() -> mt7925_mac_link_sta_remove() -> mt7925_roc_abort_sync() invokes cancel_work_sync() while roc_work() is still running and holding dev->mt76.mutex. This avoids the mutex deadlock and preserves exactly-once work ownership.