Certificate policy and RFC 8446 compliance concerns regarding the continued acceptance of SHA-1/MD5 in certificate processing.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tee: optee: prevent use-after-free when the client exits before the supplicant Commit 70b0d6b0a199 ("tee: optee: Fix supplicant wait loop") made the client wait as killable so it can be interrupted during shutdown or after a supplicant crash. This changes the original lifetime expectations: the client task can now terminate while the supplicant is still processing its request. If the client exits first it removes the request from its queue and kfree()s it, while the request ID remains in supp->idr. A subsequent lookup on the supplicant path then dereferences freed memory, leading to a use-after-free. Serialise access to the request with supp->mutex: * Hold supp->mutex in optee_supp_recv() and optee_supp_send() while looking up and touching the request. * Let optee_supp_thrd_req() notice that the client has terminated and signal optee_supp_send() accordingly. With these changes the request cannot be freed while the supplicant still has a reference, eliminating the race.

Out-of-bounds write in the Renesas TSIP TLS 1.3 transcript buffer. In tsip_StoreMessage() the capacity check guarding the fixed message bag (MSGBAG_SIZE) sets an error code but fails to return, so execution falls through to an XMEMCPY that writes past the end of the buffer once the accumulated TLS 1.3 handshake transcript exceeds MSGBAG_SIZE (8 KB), corrupting adjacent heap state and potentially causing a remote denial of service crash. The bag is sized to hold a normal handshake, so this is reached only by an unusually large but valid certificate chain, or by a malicious or man-in-the-middle server sending an oversized handshake message to a client that does not strictly verify the chain. This only affects builds using the Renesas TSIP TLS port (WOLFSSL_RENESAS_TSIP_TLS) as a TLS 1.3 client on Renesas MCUs with TSIP hardware enabled, and is rated High within those builds. All other configurations are unaffected.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netlabel: validate unlabeled address and mask attribute lengths netlbl_unlabel_addrinfo_get() used the address attribute length to determine whether the attribute data could be read as an IPv4 or IPv6 address, but did not independently validate the corresponding mask attribute length. A crafted Generic Netlink request could therefore provide a valid IPv4/IPv6 address attribute with a shorter mask attribute, which would later be read as a full struct in_addr or struct in6_addr. NLA_BINARY policy lengths are maximum lengths by default, so use NLA_POLICY_EXACT_LEN() for the unlabeled IPv4/IPv6 address and mask attributes. This rejects short attributes during policy validation and also exposes the exact length requirements through policy introspection.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: accel/ivpu: Fix signed integer truncation in IPC receive Fix potential buffer overflow where firmware-supplied data_size is cast to signed int before being used in min_t(). Large unsigned values (>= 0x80000000) become negative, causing unsigned wraparound and oversized memcpy operations that can overflow the stack buffer. Change min_t(int, ...) to min() as both values are unsigned and can be handled by min() without explicit cast.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: gpio: mvebu: fix NULL pointer dereference in suspend/resume mvebu_pwm_suspend() and mvebu_pwm_resume() are called for all GPIO banks during suspend/resume, but not all banks have PWM functionality. GPIO banks without PWM have mvchip->mvpwm set to NULL. Calling mvebu_pwm_suspend() with mvpwm == NULL causes a NULL pointer dereference when it tries to access mvpwm->blink_select. Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 00000020 when write [00000020] *pgd=00000000 Internal error: Oops: 815 [#1] PREEMPT ARM Modules linked in: CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 406 Comm: sh Not tainted 6.12.74-rt12-yocto-standard-g4e96f98fb7db-dirty #353 Hardware name: Marvell Armada 370/XP (Device Tree) PC is at regmap_mmio_read+0x38/0x54 LR is at regmap_mmio_read+0x38/0x54 pc : [<c05fd2ac>] lr : [<c05fd2ac>] psr: 200f0013 sp : f0c11d10 ip : 00000000 fp : c100d2f0 r10: c14fb854 r9 : 00000000 r8 : 00000000 r7 : c1799c00 r6 : 00000020 r5 : 00000020 r4 : c179c7c0 r3 : f0a231a0 r2 : 00000020 r1 : 00000020 r0 : 00000000 Flags: nzCv IRQs on FIQs on Mode SVC_32 ISA ARM Segment none Control: 10c5387d Table: 135ec059 DAC: 00000051 Call trace: regmap_mmio_read from _regmap_bus_reg_read+0x78/0xac _regmap_bus_reg_read from _regmap_read+0x60/0x154 _regmap_read from regmap_read+0x3c/0x60 regmap_read from mvebu_gpio_suspend+0xa4/0x14c mvebu_gpio_suspend from dpm_run_callback+0x54/0x180 dpm_run_callback from device_suspend+0x124/0x630 device_suspend from dpm_suspend+0x124/0x270 dpm_suspend from dpm_suspend_start+0x64/0x6c dpm_suspend_start from suspend_devices_and_enter+0x140/0x8e8 suspend_devices_and_enter from pm_suspend+0x2fc/0x308 pm_suspend from state_store+0x6c/0xc8 state_store from kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x10c/0x1f8 kernfs_fop_write_iter from vfs_write+0x270/0x468 vfs_write from ksys_write+0x70/0xf0 ksys_write from ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x54 Add a NULL check for mvchip->mvpwm before calling the PWM suspend/resume functions.

TLS 1.3 post-handshake authentication (PHA) issue where a server could accept a client's Finished message without the client having sent a Certificate and CertificateVerify. The post-handshake-auth exemption that allows an empty/absent peer certificate was only intended for the initial handshake, but it was also being applied while a post-handshake CertificateRequest was still outstanding. The check is now scoped to the initial handshake only: on the server, once a post-handshake CertificateRequest has been sent (certReqCtx is set), a peer certificate and a valid CertificateVerify are required again before the Finished is accepted, with empty-certificate handling following the configured verify mode (FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT) just as during first-handshake client authentication. Only affects TLS 1.3 servers built with post-handshake authentication support (WOLFSSL_POST_HANDSHAKE_AUTH / --enable-postauth, included in --enable-all) that enable WOLFSSL_VERIFY_POST_HANDSHAKE and request a client certificate after the handshake via wolfSSL_request_certificate(). Clients, and servers that do not use post-handshake authentication, are unaffected.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netdev: fix double-free in netdev_nl_bind_rx_doit() Sashiko flags that genlmsg_reply() always consumes the skb. The error path calls nlmsg_free(rsp) so we can't jump directly to it. Let's not unbind, just propagate the error to the user. This is the typical way of handling genlmsg_reply() failures. They shouldn't happen unless user does something silly like calling the kernel with an already-full rcvbuf.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: accel/ivpu: Add bounds check for firmware runtime memory Validate that the firmware runtime memory specified in the image header is properly aligned and sized to hold the firmware image. This prevents errors during memory allocation and image transfer.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: L2CAP: reject BR/EDR signaling packets over MTUsig net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:l2cap_sig_channel() accepts BR/EDR signaling packets up to the channel MTU and dispatches each command without enforcing the signaling MTU (MTUsig). A Bluetooth BR/EDR peer within radio range can send a fixed-channel CID 0x0001 packet that is larger than MTUsig and contains many L2CAP_ECHO_REQ commands before pairing. In a real-radio stock-kernel run, one 681-byte signaling packet containing 168 zero-length ECHO_REQ commands made the target transmit 168 ECHO_RSP frames over about 220 ms. Impact: a Bluetooth BR/EDR peer within radio range, before pairing, can force 168 ECHO_RSP frames from one 681-byte fixed-channel signaling packet containing packed ECHO_REQ commands. Define Linux's BR/EDR signaling MTU as the spec minimum of 48 bytes and reject any larger signaling packet with one L2CAP_COMMAND_REJECT_RSP carrying L2CAP_REJ_MTU_EXCEEDED before any command is dispatched. The Bluetooth Core spec wording for MTUExceeded says the reject identifier shall match the first request command in the packet, and that packets containing only responses shall be silently discarded. Linux intentionally deviates from that prescription: silently discarding desynchronizes the peer because the remote stack never learns its responses were dropped, and locating the first request command requires walking command headers past MTUsig, i.e. processing bytes from a packet we have already decided is too large to process. We therefore always emit one reject and use the identifier from the first command header, a single fixed-offset byte read. The unrestricted BR/EDR signaling parser and ECHO_REQ response path both trace to the initial git import; no later introducing commit is available for a Fixes tag.