7.2 HIGH
- CVSS version (CVSS): 4.0
- Attack Vector (AV): Network (N)
- Attack Complexity (AC): Low (L)
- Attack Requirement (AT): None (N)
- Privileges Required (PR): Low (L)
- User Interaction (UI): None (N)
- Vulnerable System Impact Confidentiality (VC): None (N)
- Vulnerable System Impact Integrity (VI): High (H)
- Vulnerable System Impact Availability (VA): High (H)
- Subsequent System Impact Confidentiality (SC): None (N)
- Subsequent System Impact Integrity (SI): None (N)
- Subsequent System Impact Availability (SA): None (N)
- Modified Attack Vector (MAV): Network (N)
- Modified Attack Complexity (MAC): Low (L)
- Modified Attack Requirement (MAT): None (N)
- Modified Privileges Required (MPR): Low (L)
- Modified User Interaction (MUI): None (N)
- Modified Vulnerable System Impact Confidentiality (MVC): None (N)
- Modified Vulnerable System Impact Integrity (MVI): High (H)
- Modified Vulnerable System Impact Availability (MVA): High (H)
- Modified Subsequent System Impact Confidentiality (MSC): Negligible (N)
- Modified Subsequent System Impact Integrity (MSI): Negligible (N)
- Modified Subsequent System Impact Availability (MSA): Negligible (N)
- Safety (S): Not Defined (X)
- Automatable (AU): Not Defined (X)
- Recovery (R): Not Defined (X)
- Value Density (V): Not Defined (X)
- Vulnerability Response Effort (RE): Not Defined (X)
- Provider Urgency (U): Not Defined (X)
- Confidentiality Req. (CR): Not Defined (X)
- Integrity Req. (IR): Not Defined (X)
- Availability Req. (AR): Not Defined (X)
- Exploit Maturity (E): Not Defined (X)
Activity log
- Created & dismissed (no matching packages found) suggestion
Vibe-Trading < 0.1.10 - Path Traversal in Proposal Identifier Allows Forging Live Trading Mandates
Vibe-Trading before 0.1.10 builds the proposal file path by joining a caller-supplied proposal identifier onto the broker proposals directory without sanitization (agent/src/live/mandate/commit.py). A proposal identifier containing path traversal sequences causes the application to load an attacker-controlled JSON file as an authoritative live trading mandate. Combined with the file upload endpoint, an admitted caller can write a JSON file to a known location and traverse to it, and because the ceilings validation is skipped when ceilings are absent, the attacker fully controls the committed mandate.
References
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Release Notes release-notes
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Fix Commit patch
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https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/vibe-trading-path-traversal-in-proposal-id… third-party-advisory
Affected products
- <0.1.10