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created 3 weeks, 5 days ago Activity log
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HID: usbhid: fix deadlock in hid_post_reset()

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: HID: usbhid: fix deadlock in hid_post_reset() You can build a USB device that includes a HID component and a storage or UAS component. The components can be reset only together. That means that hid_pre_reset() and hid_post_reset() are in the block IO error handling. Hence no memory allocation used in them may do block IO because the IO can deadlock on the mutex held while resetting a device and calling the interface drivers. Use GFP_NOIO for all allocations in them.

Affected products

Linux
  • <b3d16611d7cd78e9d5c6baa19b61b7caf9f1ab5e
  • =<5.15.*
  • =<6.18.*
  • <ad4505d2ab3aaac6498f17649608e70e80034bf2
  • =<6.12.*
  • <eeceb6f4dd42065fdda3a526a93d08b8fb90fb69
  • <56d318ef8766f0deb08517fd8f3007256ea7997d
  • <90550af0aad5e75110073c501e4fb42fca20ff80
  • <3.5
  • <8df2c1b47ee3cd50fd454f75c7a7e2ae8a6adf72
  • <c7abd0e6c87441e99c759d40eb6fe589634e3041
  • =<7.0.*
  • =<*
  • <4e900465296ce9fb12ed47dc77389b8dde95bfe0
  • ==3.5
  • =<6.1.*
  • =<5.10.*
  • =<6.6.*
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created 3 weeks, 5 days ago Activity log
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fs/ntfs3: fix missing run load for vcn0 in attr_data_get_block_locked()

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fs/ntfs3: fix missing run load for vcn0 in attr_data_get_block_locked() When a compressed or sparse attribute has its clusters frame-aligned, vcn is rounded down to the frame start using cmask, which can result in vcn != vcn0. In this case, vcn and vcn0 may reside in different attribute segments. The code already handles the case where vcn is in a different segment by loading its runs before allocation. However, it fails to load runs for vcn0 when vcn0 resides in a different segment than vcn. This causes run_lookup_entry() to return SPARSE_LCN for vcn0 since its segment was never loaded into the in-memory run list, triggering the WARN_ON(1). Fix this by adding a missing check for vcn0 after the existing vcn segment check. If vcn0 falls outside the current segment range [svcn, evcn1), find and load the attribute segment containing vcn0 before performing the run lookup. The following scenario triggers the bug: attr_data_get_block_locked() vcn = vcn0 & cmask <- vcn != vcn0 after frame alignment load runs for vcn segment <- vcn0 segment not loaded! attr_allocate_clusters() <- allocation succeeds run_lookup_entry(vcn0) <- vcn0 not in run -> SPARSE_LCN WARN_ON(1) <- bug fires here!

Affected products

Linux
  • =<7.0.*
  • <d7ea8495fd307b58f8867acd81a1b40075b1d3ba
  • ==406a037d93b769bca248476bd14bbe548dc1ec35
  • ==6.2
  • <2b4ae1ce613ade8a7e118fba4a5a77cd23e97e54
  • =<*
  • <6.2
  • <6.2
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created 3 weeks, 5 days ago Activity log
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ceph: fix a buffer leak in __ceph_setxattr()

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ceph: fix a buffer leak in __ceph_setxattr() The old_blob in __ceph_setxattr() can store ci->i_xattrs.prealloc_blob value during the retry. However, it is never called the ceph_buffer_put() for the old_blob object. This patch fixes the issue of the buffer leak.

Affected products

Linux
  • =<6.18.*
  • <5.15.209
  • =<7.0.*
  • <5.10.258
  • <d0cb994605c84a159c1d00d72cdc8583c321ef95
  • =<6.1.*
  • <6.18.33
  • <7.0.10
  • <6.1.175
  • <bc7abce4460e490dcb579eec770f175b150b685f
  • <ecf94823c5c6a20790bb76ed2816822b0beb0c22
  • <6.6.141
  • <4bfdcefdaa6092a06cacd59389c7756b36e6de8c
  • <521e5aba857fd267624892c8dd6295f22ce0267e
  • =<5.15.*
  • <7d3e8d2d648d5f0df29b4710246680f47695fe94
  • =<*
  • <6.12.91
  • <5d3cc36b4e77a27ce7b686b7c59c7072bcb3fa8e
  • <3fa13ceefbc5f36131110342743994cb3de80637
  • =<6.12.*
  • =<5.10.*
  • =<6.6.*
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created 3 weeks, 5 days ago Activity log
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sctp: stream: fully roll back denied add-stream state

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sctp: stream: fully roll back denied add-stream state When ADD_OUT_STREAMS is denied, SCTP only shrinks the queued chunks and then lowers outcnt. That leaves removed stream metadata behind, so a later re-add can reuse a stale ext and hit a null-pointer dereference in the scheduler get path. Fix the rollback by tearing down the removed stream state the same way other stream resizes do. Unschedule the current scheduler state, drop the removed stream ext state with sctp_stream_outq_migrate(), and then reschedule the remaining streams. This keeps scheduler-private RR/FC/PRIO lists consistent while fully rolling back denied outgoing stream additions.

Affected products

Linux
  • <9662eb0401518f0b4681f10e7fbf688f504f24cf
  • =<6.1.*
  • =<5.15.*
  • <d5ea0b3e261fcb2cfff142675516165244cab1da
  • =<6.18.*
  • <0cd2dc6dce8ca47212cd306ccd52eb315ef3cf85
  • =<6.12.*
  • <1c6773b8c081509dcd5cd2954f2b02c50c00f151
  • =<7.0.*
  • <a5f8a90ac9f77c678a9781c0a464b635e0d63e49
  • <39dc2b0eb5371a669ebc9ec6072b9184eac95418
  • <4.15
  • =<*
  • <7dd9a42b044aad2dbe037db1c1e2943582485b44
  • <a6724b7b812ac8793514a1d5938db5d9d29ae725
  • =<5.10.*
  • ==4.15
  • =<6.6.*
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created 3 weeks, 5 days ago Activity log
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fs/adfs: validate nzones in adfs_validate_bblk()

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fs/adfs: validate nzones in adfs_validate_bblk() Reject ADFS disc records with a zero zone count during boot block validation, before the disc record is used. When nzones is 0, adfs_read_map() passes it to kmalloc_array(0, ...) which returns ZERO_SIZE_PTR, and adfs_map_layout() then writes to dm[-1], causing an out-of-bounds write before the allocated buffer. adfs_validate_dr0() already rejects nzones != 1 for old-format images. Add the equivalent check to adfs_validate_bblk() for new-format images so that a crafted image with nzones == 0 is rejected at probe time. Found by syzkaller.

Affected products

Linux
  • <dd9d3e16c2d5fa166e13dce07413be51f42c8f5d
  • <5.6
  • =<5.15.*
  • <33aafd2418a59c96c0389d47ea09026661fa9ec6
  • <a3fd5dc1c7b0aae947a67dc2e2c037d57557a4de
  • =<6.18.*
  • =<6.12.*
  • =<7.0.*
  • <1f0ed0f57f0fc87e46fe19a05435c214dc464be2
  • <6ff8cca5cdb4f2e0ea6d28ecd78479dd3f221ebc
  • <1586bd2d2fb436a26df20a70e78b000d34a7d159
  • =<*
  • =<5.10.*
  • <a11372a8b1ceaa5e950a84b3b5fbf8228f25e277
  • ==5.6
  • =<6.1.*
  • <60d82592ac8b5637fbed871381eb0a16df0a492e
  • =<6.6.*
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created 3 weeks, 5 days ago Activity log
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drm/xe: Fix error cleanup in xe_exec_queue_create_ioctl()

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/xe: Fix error cleanup in xe_exec_queue_create_ioctl() Two error handling issues exist in xe_exec_queue_create_ioctl(): 1. When xe_hw_engine_group_add_exec_queue() fails, the error path jumps to put_exec_queue which skips xe_exec_queue_kill(). If the VM is in preempt fence mode, xe_vm_add_compute_exec_queue() has already added the queue to the VM's compute exec queue list. Skipping the kill leaves the queue on that list, leading to a dangling pointer after the queue is freed. 2. When xa_alloc() fails after xe_hw_engine_group_add_exec_queue() has succeeded, the error path does not call xe_hw_engine_group_del_exec_queue() to remove the queue from the hw engine group list. The queue is then freed while still linked into the hw engine group, causing a use-after-free. Fix both by: - Changing the xe_hw_engine_group_add_exec_queue() failure path to jump to kill_exec_queue so that xe_exec_queue_kill() properly removes the queue from the VM's compute list. - Adding a del_hw_engine_group label before kill_exec_queue for the xa_alloc() failure path, which removes the queue from the hw engine group before proceeding with the rest of the cleanup. (cherry picked from commit 37c831f401746a45d510b312b0ed7a77b1e06ec8)

Affected products

Linux
  • <6.12
  • <753b149d5a433eb19e0c1b0eb4526a6e26120d1f
  • <f3cc22d4df3ed58439ea7e21daa54c3608e03b78
  • =<6.18.*
  • <f93b00161213a0fe9f7ff1d8498ee5ca9e0a5c43
  • =<7.0.*
  • ==6.12
  • =<*
  • <1be55646d8a2035343b012dcb12210db7bb8b056
  • =<6.12.*
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created 3 weeks, 5 days ago Activity log
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bpf: Fix stale offload->prog pointer after constant blinding

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Fix stale offload->prog pointer after constant blinding When a dev-bound-only BPF program (BPF_F_XDP_DEV_BOUND_ONLY) undergoes JIT compilation with constant blinding enabled (bpf_jit_harden >= 2), bpf_jit_blind_constants() clones the program. The original prog is then freed in bpf_jit_prog_release_other(), which updates aux->prog to point to the surviving clone, but fails to update offload->prog. This leaves offload->prog pointing to the freed original program. When the network namespace is subsequently destroyed, cleanup_net() triggers bpf_dev_bound_netdev_unregister(), which iterates ondev->progs and calls __bpf_prog_offload_destroy(offload->prog). Accessing the freed prog causes a page fault: BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffc900085f1038 Workqueue: netns cleanup_net RIP: 0010:__bpf_prog_offload_destroy+0xc/0x80 Call Trace: __bpf_offload_dev_netdev_unregister+0x257/0x350 bpf_dev_bound_netdev_unregister+0x4a/0x90 unregister_netdevice_many_notify+0x2a2/0x660 ... cleanup_net+0x21a/0x320 The test sequence that triggers this reliably is: 1. Set net.core.bpf_jit_harden=2 (echo 2 > /proc/sys/net/core/bpf_jit_harden) 2. Run xdp_metadata selftest, which creates a dev-bound-only XDP program on a veth inside a netns (./test_progs -t xdp_metadata) 3. cleanup_net -> page fault in __bpf_prog_offload_destroy Dev-bound-only programs are unique in that they have an offload structure but go through the normal JIT path instead of bpf_prog_offload_compile(). This means they are subject to constant blinding's prog clone-and-replace, while also having offload->prog that must stay in sync. Fix this by updating offload->prog in bpf_jit_prog_release_other(), alongside the existing aux->prog update. Both are back-pointers to the prog that must be kept in sync when the prog is replaced.

Affected products

Linux
  • <c79f8503d83d4665be461fb9e45e215d0380c67b
  • ==6.3
  • =<6.18.*
  • <6.3
  • =<7.0.*
  • <25484c39d1ec82a0368798d956da3de5039b3fe8
  • <a713b72ff88cdab4d5d692908ab1259ada511f4d
  • =<*
  • <a1aa9ef47c299c5bbc30594d3c2f0589edf908e6
  • =<6.12.*
  • <059525cf18e69a9313baf947d8898c6ee7ca6b65
  • =<6.6.*
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Permalink CVE-2026-13028
9.6 CRITICAL
  • CVSS version (CVSS): 3.1
  • Attack Vector (AV): Network (N)
  • Attack Complexity (AC): Low (L)
  • Privileges Required (PR): None (N)
  • User Interaction (UI): Required (R)
  • Scope (S): Changed (C)
  • Confidentiality (C): High (H)
  • Integrity (I): High (H)
  • Availability (A): High (H)
  • Modified Attack Vector (MAV): Network (N)
  • Modified Attack Complexity (MAC): Low (L)
  • Modified Privileges Required (MPR): None (N)
  • Modified User Interaction (MUI): Required (R)
  • Modified Confidentiality (MC): High (H)
  • Modified Scope (MS): Changed (C)
  • Modified Integrity (MI): High (H)
  • Modified Availability (MA): High (H)
created 3 weeks, 5 days ago Activity log
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Use after free in WebGL in Google Chrome on Android …

Use after free in WebGL in Google Chrome on Android prior to 149.0.7827.197 allowed a remote attacker to potentially perform a sandbox escape via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Critical)

Affected products

Chrome
  • <149.0.7827.197
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created 3 weeks, 5 days ago Activity log
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dm cache: fix null-deref with concurrent writes in passthrough mode

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: dm cache: fix null-deref with concurrent writes in passthrough mode In passthrough mode, when dm-cache starts to invalidate a cache entry and bio prison cell lock fails due to concurrent write to the same cached block, mg->cell remains NULL. The error path in invalidate_complete() attempts to unlock and free the cell unconditionally, causing a NULL pointer dereference: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 134 Comm: fio Not tainted 6.19.0-rc7 #3 PREEMPT RIP: 0010:dm_cell_unlock_v2+0x3f/0x210 <snip> Call Trace: invalidate_complete+0xef/0x430 map_bio+0x130f/0x1a10 cache_map+0x320/0x6b0 __map_bio+0x458/0x510 dm_submit_bio+0x40e/0x16d0 __submit_bio+0x419/0x870 <snip> Reproduce steps: 1. Create a cache device dmsetup create cmeta --table "0 8192 linear /dev/sdc 0" dmsetup create cdata --table "0 131072 linear /dev/sdc 8192" dmsetup create corig --table "0 262144 linear /dev/sdc 262144" dd if=/dev/zero of=/dev/mapper/cmeta bs=4k count=1 oflag=direct dmsetup create cache --table "0 262144 cache /dev/mapper/cmeta \ /dev/mapper/cdata /dev/mapper/corig 128 2 metadata2 writethrough smq 0" 2. Promote the first data block into cache fio --filename=/dev/mapper/cache --name=populate --rw=write --bs=4k \ --direct=1 --size=64k 3. Reload the cache into passthrough mode dmsetup suspend cache dmsetup reload cache --table "0 262144 cache /dev/mapper/cmeta \ /dev/mapper/cdata /dev/mapper/corig 128 2 metadata2 passthrough smq 0" dmsetup resume cache 4. Write to the first cached block concurrently fio --filename=/dev/mapper/cache --name test --rw=randwrite --bs=4k \ --randrepeat=0 --direct=1 --numjobs=2 --size 64k Fix by checking if mg->cell is valid before attempting to unlock it.

Affected products

Linux
  • <01264a6a3a3ad7ac1d73443299cd5a9568002454
  • <ee38fb00e1a80f46a4990e38f25ecb04ae7b7417
  • <df3b8ef06cc62de4fca5d2108e285085b3cffd44
  • ==4.12
  • =<5.15.*
  • =<6.18.*
  • <25dcc1989c194ba2b5fb6d03cbb9b83814ac0d15
  • =<6.12.*
  • =<7.0.*
  • <a2635d541a93fd111e743cf14b6275dc81be2abc
  • =<*
  • <4.12
  • <7d1f98d668ee34c1d15bdc0420fdd062f24a27c0
  • =<5.10.*
  • =<6.1.*
  • <0aa745fea1f8dc81bcdd0a45e215b6706727b482
  • <c7fb6bc864c4910b344dafa36dd5028e9b980768
  • =<6.6.*
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created 3 weeks, 5 days ago Activity log
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btrfs: fix deadlock between reflink and transaction commit when using flushoncommit

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: btrfs: fix deadlock between reflink and transaction commit when using flushoncommit When using the flushoncommit mount option, we can have a deadlock between a transaction commit and a reflink operation that copied an inline extent to an offset beyond the current i_size of the destination node. The deadlock happens like this: 1) Task A clones an inline extent from inode X to an offset of inode Y that is beyond Y's current i_size. This means we copied the inline extent's data to a folio of inode Y that is beyond its EOF, using a call to copy_inline_to_page(); 2) Task B starts a transaction commit and calls btrfs_start_delalloc_flush() to flush delalloc; 3) The delalloc flushing sees the new dirty folio of inode Y and when it attempts to flush it, it ends up at extent_writepage() and sees that the offset of the folio is beyond the i_size of inode Y, so it attempts to invalidate the folio by calling folio_invalidate(), which ends up at btrfs' folio invalidate callback - btrfs_invalidate_folio(). There it tries to lock the folio's range in inode Y's extent io tree, but it blocks since it's currently locked by task A - during a reflink we lock the inodes and the source and destination ranges after flushing all delalloc and waiting for ordered extent completion - after that we don't expect to have dirty folios in the ranges, the exception is if we have to copy an inline extent's data (because the destination offset is not zero); 4) Task A then attempts to start a transaction to update the inode item, and then it's blocked since the current transaction is in the TRANS_STATE_COMMIT_START state. Therefore task A has to wait for the current transaction to become unblocked (its state >= TRANS_STATE_UNBLOCKED). So task A is waiting for the transaction commit done by task B, and the later waiting on the extent lock of inode Y that is currently held by task A. Syzbot recently reported this with the following stack traces: INFO: task kworker/u8:7:1053 blocked for more than 143 seconds. Not tainted syzkaller #0 "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message. task:kworker/u8:7 state:D stack:23520 pid:1053 tgid:1053 ppid:2 task_flags:0x4208060 flags:0x00080000 Workqueue: writeback wb_workfn (flush-btrfs-46) Call Trace: <TASK> context_switch kernel/sched/core.c:5298 [inline] __schedule+0x1553/0x5240 kernel/sched/core.c:6911 __schedule_loop kernel/sched/core.c:6993 [inline] schedule+0x164/0x360 kernel/sched/core.c:7008 wait_extent_bit fs/btrfs/extent-io-tree.c:811 [inline] btrfs_lock_extent_bits+0x59c/0x700 fs/btrfs/extent-io-tree.c:1914 btrfs_lock_extent fs/btrfs/extent-io-tree.h:152 [inline] btrfs_invalidate_folio+0x43d/0xc40 fs/btrfs/inode.c:7704 extent_writepage fs/btrfs/extent_io.c:1852 [inline] extent_write_cache_pages fs/btrfs/extent_io.c:2580 [inline] btrfs_writepages+0x12ff/0x2440 fs/btrfs/extent_io.c:2713 do_writepages+0x32e/0x550 mm/page-writeback.c:2554 __writeback_single_inode+0x133/0x11a0 fs/fs-writeback.c:1750 writeback_sb_inodes+0x995/0x19d0 fs/fs-writeback.c:2042 wb_writeback+0x456/0xb70 fs/fs-writeback.c:2227 wb_do_writeback fs/fs-writeback.c:2374 [inline] wb_workfn+0x41a/0xf60 fs/fs-writeback.c:2414 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3276 [inline] process_scheduled_works+0xb6e/0x18c0 kernel/workqueue.c:3359 worker_thread+0xa53/0xfc0 kernel/workqueue.c:3440 kthread+0x388/0x470 kernel/kthread.c:436 ret_from_fork+0x51e/0xb90 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245 </TASK> INFO: task syz.4.64:6910 blocked for more than 143 seconds. Not tainted syzkaller #0 "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message. task:syz.4.64 state:D stack:22752 pid:6910 tgid: ---truncated---

Affected products

Linux
  • <6f0f9c0a368aa1fe078109091322d3b0632d9380
  • <b48c980b6a7e409050bb3067165db31cc6205e3e
  • =<6.18.*
  • ==5.7
  • =<7.0.*
  • <73be4a08306bb84f4d5d16f62cb80e1543109ffa
  • =<*
  • <5.7
  • =<6.12.*
  • <9a24f0000876b8755cf21972b41632f4d6f3dafb