OpenClaw before 2026.4.25 contains a control scope enforcement bypass vulnerability in the focus command that allows authenticated callers to execute the command without proper authorization checks. Attackers can trigger the focus command to change focus state outside intended caller authority, potentially enabling unauthorized operations depending on gateway configuration and input trust levels.

Unauthenticated Local File Inclusion in Abelle <= 1.22 versions.

OpenClaw before 2026.4.25 contains a privilege escalation vulnerability in internal and webchat command authentication that allows senders to inherit wildcard ownerAllowFrom state across channel boundaries. Attackers can exploit this by sending commands on affected internal or webchat paths to execute owner-style command behavior outside intended channel scope, potentially bypassing access controls.

Unauthenticated Local File Inclusion in Choreo <= 1.6 versions.

OpenClaw before 2026.5.7 contains a privilege escalation vulnerability where the allowFrom feature improperly validates Discord account identity using mutable display names instead of immutable user IDs. Attackers with Discord accounts can change their display name to match a policy entry and gain unauthorized agent access intended for another Discord identity.

A flaw was found in evolution-data-server. Inconsistent comparison logic in the addressbook file backend allows a Flatpak application with D-Bus access to craft a malicious URI containing directory traversal sequences. This URI is stored without proper validation during contact creation or modification. Later, during contact deletion, the URI is processed with a less strict check, leading to the deletion of arbitrary files on the host filesystem. This could potentially include critical Flatpak override files.

FileBrowser Quantum is a free, self-hosted, web-based file manager. Versions prior to 1.3.2-stable, 1.4.0-beta and 1.4.1-beta are vulnerable to Path Traversal through the publicPatchHandler in backend/http/public.go which joins user-controlled fromPath and toPath body fields with the trusted d.share.Path BEFORE the downstream sanitizer runs. Because filepath.Join collapses .. segments during the join, the sanitizer in resourcePatchHandler never sees the traversal and the move/copy/rename operates on a path outside the shared directory. The same root-cause pattern was patched for the bulk DELETE endpoint as CVE-2026-44542 (GHSA-fwj3-42wh-8673), but the PATCH handler with the identical pattern was not updated. A public share link with AllowModify=true is sufficient to exploit this. Anyone holding such a link can move, copy, or rename arbitrary files within the share owner's source root. This issue has been fixed in versions 1.3.3-stable and 1.4.2-beta.

OpenClaw before 2026.4.2 contains an inline-eval bypass vulnerability allowing authenticated operators to weaken strict allowlist checks via shell positional parameters. Attackers can combine allowlisted tools with shell positional arguments to place inline-eval content in shell carriers outside intended allowlist rules, enabling execution of unapproved shell-provided content.

Unauthenticated Local File Inclusion in Putter <= 1.17 versions.

To allow builds of Python to be run from an in-tree layout (rather than an installed file layout), the VPATH variable is defined at build time and used to locate certain landmarks - specifically, Modules/setup.local. When this landmark is found relative to VPATH relative to the executable, Python assumes it is running in a source tree and generates a different default sys.path. This code remains in release builds, so that release-ready builds can be built in-tree. On Windows, since builds are written to 'PCbuild/', the value of VPATH is set to '..\..', which results in a landmark of '..\..\Modules\setup.local'. This path is outside the install directory of Python, and may have different permissions, potentially allowing a low-privilege user to create the landmark and an alternative `Lib` folder that will be discovered by an otherwise restricted install. Such a setup occurs with the legacy default install location for all users (in the now superseded EXE installer), due to how Windows allows all users to create folders in the root directory of their OS drive. Our recommended mitigation on Windows is to migrate away from the legacy installer and use the new [Python install manager](https://www.python.org/downloads/latest/pymanager/) to install for the current user. Installs where the directory two levels above the Python installation directory have equivalent permissions are unaffected (in general, a per-user install cannot be modified at all by other users, removing any escalation of privilege risk, and could be directly modified by a privileged user, making the potential tampering irrelevant). Alternative mitigations might include preemptively creating and restricting access to a `Modules` directory. Be aware that only 3.13 and 3.14 will receive updated legacy installers - earlier fixes are only provided as sources. Platforms other than Windows allow VPATH to be overridden, but as they don't usually use a separated directory in the build for binaries, are unlikely to have a landmark reference outside of the install directory. The landmark detection involving VPATH is a fallback for when a more specific landmark - .\pybuilddir.txt - is absent, and was included for compatibility. Future releases of Python will no longer include the fallback, and so builds will need to generate or preserve the pybuilddir.txt file in order to work in-tree. This landmark file has been generated on Windows since 3.11, and on other platforms for longer.