SteVe is an open-source EV charging station management system. In versions up to and including 3.11.0, when a charger sends a StopTransaction message, SteVe looks up the transaction solely by transactionId (a sequential integer starting from 1) without verifying that the requesting charger matches the charger that originally started the transaction. Any authenticated charger can terminate any other charger’s active session across the entire network. The root cause is in OcppServerRepositoryImpl.getTransaction() which queries only by transactionId with no chargeBoxId ownership check. The validator checks that the transaction exists and is not already stopped but never verifies identity. As an attacker controlling a single registered charger I could enumerate sequential transaction IDs and send StopTransaction messages targeting active sessions on every other charger on the network simultaneously. Combined with FINDING-014 (unauthenticated SOAP endpoints), no registered charger is even required — the attack is executable with a single curl command requiring only a known chargeBoxId. Commit 7f169c6c5b36a9c458ec41ce8af581972e5c724e contains a fix for the issue.

hoppscotch is an open source API development ecosystem. Prior to version 2026.2.0, any logged-in user can read, modify or delete another user's personal environment by ID. `user-environments.resolver.ts:82-109`, `updateUserEnvironment` mutation uses `@UseGuards(GqlAuthGuard)` but is missing the `@GqlUser()` decorator entirely. The user's identity is never extracted, so the service receives only the environment ID and performs a `prisma.userEnvironment.update({ where: { id } })` without any ownership filter. `deleteUserEnvironment` does extract the user but the service only uses the UID to check if the target is a global environment. Actual delete query uses WHERE { id } without AND userUid. hoppscotch environments store API keys, auth tokens and secrets used in API requests. An authenticated attacker who obtains another user's environment ID can read their secrets, replace them with malicious values or delete them entirely. The environment ID format is CUID, which limits mass exploitation but insider threat and combined info leak scenarios are realistic. Version 2026.2.0 fixes the issue.

Zen C is a systems programming language that compiles to human-readable GNU C/C11. Prior to version 0.4.2, a command injection vulnerability (CWE-78) in the Zen C compiler allows local attackers to execute arbitrary shell commands by providing a specially crafted output filename via the `-o` command-line argument. The vulnerability existed in the `main` application logic (specifically in `src/main.c`), where the compiler constructed a shell command string to invoke the backend C compiler. This command string was built by concatenating various arguments, including the user-controlled output filename, and was subsequently executed using the `system()` function. Because `system()` invokes a shell to parse and execute the command, shell metacharacters within the output filename were interpreted by the shell, leading to arbitrary command execution. An attacker who can influence the command-line arguments passed to the `zc` compiler (like through a build script or a CI/CD pipeline configuration) can execute arbitrary commands with the privileges of the user running the compiler. The vulnerability has been fixed in version 0.4.2 by removing `system()` calls, implementing `ArgList`, and internal argument handling. Users are advised to update to Zen C version v0.4.2 or later.

The Terraform Provider for Linode versions prior to v3.9.0 logged sensitive information including some passwords, StackScript content, and object storage data in debug logs without redaction. Provider debug logging is not enabled by default. This issue is exposed when debug/provider logs are explicitly enabled (for example in local troubleshooting, CI/CD jobs, or centralized log collection). If enabled, sensitive values may be written to logs and then retained, shared, or exported beyond the original execution environment. An authenticated user with access to provider debug logs (through log aggregation systems, CI/CD pipelines, or debug output) would thus be able to extract these sensitive credentials. Versions 3.9.0 and later sanitize debug logs by logging only non-sensitive metadata such as labels, regions, and resource IDs while redacting credentials, tokens, keys, scripts, and other sensitive content. Some other mitigations and workarounds are available. Disable Terraform/provider debug logging or set it to `WARN` level or above, restrict access to existing and historical logs, purge/retention-trim logs that may contain sensitive values, and/or rotate potentially exposed secrets/credentials.

Discourse is an open source discussion platform. Prior to versions 2025.12.2, 2026.1.1, and 2026.2.0, when the `patreon_webhook_secret` site setting is blank, an attacker can forge valid webhook signatures by computing an HMAC-MD5 with an empty string as the key. Since the request body is known to the sender, the attacker can produce a matching signature and send arbitrary webhook payloads. This allows unauthorized creation, modification, or deletion of Patreon pledge data and triggering patron-to-group synchronization. This vulnerability is patched in versions 2025.12.2, 2026.1.1, and 2026.2.0. The fix rejects webhook requests when the webhook secret is not configured, preventing signature forgery with an empty key. As a workaround, configure the `patreon_webhook_secret` site setting with a strong, non-empty secret value. When the secret is non-empty, an attacker cannot forge valid signatures without knowing the secret.

Zulip is an open-source team collaboration tool. Prior to commit bf28c82dc9b1f630fa8e9106358771b20a0040f7, the API endpoint for creating a card update session during an upgrade flow was accessible to users with only organization member privileges. When the associated Stripe Checkout session is completed, the Stripe webhook updates the organization’s default payment method. Because no billing-specific authorization check is enforced, a regular (non-billing) member can change the organization’s payment method. This vulnerability affected the Zulip Cloud payment processing system, and has been patched as of commit bf28c82dc9b1f630fa8e9106358771b20a0040f7. Self-hosted deploys are no longer affected and no patch or upgrade is required for them.

FreeRDP is a free implementation of the Remote Desktop Protocol. Prior to version 3.23.0, `xf_clipboard_format_equal` reads freed `lastSentFormats` memory because `xf_clipboard_formats_free` (called from the cliprdr channel thread during auto-reconnect) frees the array while the X11 event thread concurrently iterates it in `xf_clipboard_changed`, triggering a heap use after free. Version 3.23.0 fixes the issue.

Karakeep is a elf-hostable bookmark-everything app. In version 0.30.0, when the Reddit metascraper plugin returns `readableContentHtml`, the HTML parsing subprocess uses it directly without running it through DOMPurify. Every other content source in the crawler goes through Readability + DOMPurify, but the Reddit path skips both. Since this content ends up in `dangerouslySetInnerHTML` in the reader view, any malicious HTML in the Reddit response gets executed in the user's browser. Version 0.31.0 contains a patch for this issue.

n8n is an open source workflow automation platform. Prior to versions 2.10.1, 2.9.3, and 1.123.22, a second-order expression injection vulnerability existed in n8n's Form nodes that could allow an unauthenticated attacker to inject and evaluate arbitrary n8n expressions by submitting crafted form data. When chained with an expression sandbox escape, this could escalate to remote code execution on the n8n host. The vulnerability requires a specific workflow configuration to be exploitable. First, a form node with a field interpolating a value provided by an unauthenticated user, e.g. a form submitted value. Second, the field value must begin with an `=` character, which caused n8n to treat it as an expression and triggered a double-evaluation of the field content. There is no practical reason for a workflow designer to prefix a field with `=` intentionally — the character is not rendered in the output, so the result would not match the designer's expectations. If added accidentally, it would be noticeable and very unlikely to persist. An unauthenticated attacker would need to either know about this specific circumstance on a target instance or discover a matching form by chance. Even when the preconditions are met, the expression injection alone is limited to data accessible within the n8n expression context. Escalation to remote code execution requires chaining with a separate sandbox escape vulnerability. The issue has been fixed in n8n versions 2.10.1, 2.9.3, and 1.123.22. Users should upgrade to one of these versions or later to remediate the vulnerability. If upgrading is not immediately possible, administrators should consider the following temporary mitigations. Review usage of form nodes manually for above mentioned preconditions, disable the Form node by adding `n8n-nodes-base.form` to the `NODES_EXCLUDE` environment variable, and/or disable the Form Trigger node by adding `n8n-nodes-base.formTrigger` to the `NODES_EXCLUDE` environment variable. These workarounds do not fully remediate the risk and should only be used as short-term mitigation measures.

A vulnerability was detected in Chia Blockchain 2.1.0. Impacted is an unknown function of the file /send_transaction. The manipulation results in cross-site request forgery. The attack may be performed from remote. The attack requires a high level of complexity. The exploitability is considered difficult. The exploit is now public and may be used. The vendor was informed early via email. A separate report via bugbounty was rejected with the reason "This is by design. The user is responsible for host security".