JOSE is a Javascript Object Signing and Encryption (JOSE) library. Prior to version 0.3.5+1, a vulnerability in jose could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to forge valid JWS/JWT tokens by using a key embedded in the JOSE header (jwk). The vulnerability exists because key selection could treat header-provided jwk as a verification candidate even when that key was not present in the trusted key store. Since JOSE headers are untrusted input, an attacker could exploit this by creating a token payload, embedding an attacker-controlled public key in the header, and signing with the matching private key. Applications using affected versions for token verification are impacted. This issue has been patched in version 0.3.5+1. A workaround for this issue involves rejecting tokens where header jwk is present unless that jwk matches a key already present in the application's trusted key store.

joserfc is a Python library that provides an implementation of several JSON Object Signing and Encryption (JOSE) standards. In 1.6.2 and earlier, a resource exhaustion vulnerability in joserfc allows an unauthenticated attacker to cause a Denial of Service (DoS) via CPU exhaustion. When the library decrypts a JSON Web Encryption (JWE) token using Password-Based Encryption (PBES2) algorithms, it reads the p2c (PBES2 Count) parameter directly from the token's protected header. This parameter defines the number of iterations for the PBKDF2 key derivation function. Because joserfc does not validate or bound this value, an attacker can specify an extremely large iteration count (e.g., 2^31 - 1), forcing the server to expend massive CPU resources processing a single token. This vulnerability exists at the JWA layer and impacts all high-level JWE and JWT decryption interfaces if PBES2 algorithms are allowed by the application's policy.