Wasmtime is a runtime for WebAssembly. Prior to 24.0.7, 36.0.7, 42.0.2, and 43.0.1, Wasmtime contains a possible panic which can happen when a flags-typed component model value is lifted with the Val type. If bits are set outside of the set of flags the component model specifies that these bits should be ignored but Wasmtime will panic when this value is lifted. This panic only affects wasmtime's implementation of lifting into Val, not when using the flags! macro. This additionally only affects flags-typed values which are part of a WIT interface. This has the risk of being a guest-controlled panic within the host which Wasmtime considers a DoS vector. This vulnerability is fixed in 24.0.7, 36.0.7, 42.0.2, and 43.0.1.

Wasmtime is a runtime for WebAssembly. From 32.0.0 to before 36.0.7, 42.0.2, and 43.0.1, Wasmtime's Cranelift compilation backend contains a bug on aarch64 when performing a certain shape of heap accesses which means that the wrong address is accessed. When combined with explicit bounds checks a guest WebAssembly module this can create a situation where there are two diverging computations for the same address: one for the address to bounds-check and one for the address to load. This difference in address being operated on means that a guest module can pass a bounds check but then load a different address. Combined together this enables an arbitrary read/write primitive for guest WebAssembly when accesssing host memory. This is a sandbox escape as guests are able to read/write arbitrary host memory. This vulnerability has a few ingredients, all of which must be met, for this situation to occur and bypass the sandbox restrictions. This miscompiled shape of load only occurs on 64-bit WebAssembly linear memories, or when Config::wasm_memory64 is enabled. 32-bit WebAssembly is not affected. Spectre mitigations or signals-based-traps must be disabled. When spectre mitigations are enabled then the offending shape of load is not generated. When signals-based-traps are disabled then spectre mitigations are also automatically disabled. The specific bug in Cranelift is a miscompile of a load of the shape load(iadd(base, ishl(index, amt))) where amt is a constant. The amt value is masked incorrectly to test if it's a certain value, and this incorrect mask means that Cranelift can pattern-match this lowering rule during instruction selection erroneously, diverging from WebAssembly's and Cranelift's semantics. This incorrect lowering would, for example, load an address much further away than intended as the correct address's computation would have wrapped around to a smaller value insetad. This vulnerability is fixed in 36.0.7, 42.0.2, and 43.0.1.

Wasmtime is a runtime for WebAssembly. Prior to versions 24.0.6, 36.0.6, 4.0.04, 41.0.4, and 42.0.0, Wasmtime's implementation of WASI host interfaces are susceptible to guest-controlled resource exhaustion on the host. Wasmtime did not appropriately place limits on resource allocations requested by the guests. This serves as a Denial of Service vector. Wasmtime 24.0.6, 36.0.6, 40.0.4, 41.0.4, and 42.0.0 have all been released with the fix for this issue. These versions do not prevent this issue in their default configuration to avoid breaking preexisting behaviors. All versions of Wasmtime have appropriate knobs to prevent this behavior, and Wasmtime 42.0.0-and-later will have these knobs tuned by default to prevent this issue from happening. There are no known workarounds for this issue without upgrading. Embedders are recommended to upgrade and configure their embeddings as necessary to prevent possibly-malicious guests from triggering this issue.

Wasmtime is a runtime for WebAssembly. Starting with Wasmtime 39.0.0, the `component-model-async` feature became the default, which brought with it a new implementation of `[Typed]Func::call_async` which made it capable of calling async-typed guest export functions. However, that implementation had a bug leading to a panic under certain circumstances: First, the host embedding calls `[Typed]Func::call_async` on a function exported by a component, polling the returned `Future` once. Second, the component function yields control to the async runtime (e.g. Tokio), e.g. due to a call to host function registered using `LinkerInstance::func_wrap_async` which yields, or due an epoch interruption. Third, the host embedding drops the `Future` after polling it once. This leaves the component instance in a non-reenterable state since the call never had a chance to complete. Fourth, the host embedding calls `[Typed]Func::call_async` again, polling the returned `Future`. Since the component instance cannot be entered at this point, the call traps, but not before allocating a task and thread for the call. Fifth, the host embedding ignores the trap and drops the `Future`. This panics due to the runtime attempting to dispose of the task created above, which panics since the thread has not yet exited. When a host embedder using the affected versions of Wasmtime calls `wasmtime::component::[Typed]Func::call_async` on a guest export and then drops the returned future without waiting for it to resolve, and then does so again with the same component instance, Wasmtime will panic. Embeddings that have the `component-model-async` compile-time feature disabled are unaffected. Wasmtime 40.0.4 and 41.0.4 have been patched to fix this issue. Versions 42.0.0 and later are not affected. If an embedding is not actually using any component-model-async features then disabling the `component-model-async` Cargo feature can work around this issue. This issue can also be worked around by either ensuring every `call_async` future is awaited until it completes or refraining from using the `Store` again after dropping a not-yet-resolved `call_async` future.

Wasmtime is a runtime for WebAssembly. Prior to versions 24.0.6, 36.0.6, 4.0.04, 41.0.4, and 42.0.0, Wasmtime's implementation of the `wasi:http/types.fields` resource is susceptible to panics when too many fields are added to the set of headers. Wasmtime's implementation in the `wasmtime-wasi-http` crate is backed by a data structure which panics when it reaches excessive capacity and this condition was not handled gracefully in Wasmtime. Panicking in a WASI implementation is a Denial of Service vector for embedders and is treated as a security vulnerability in Wasmtime. Wasmtime 24.0.6, 36.0.6, 40.0.4, 41.0.4, and 42.0.0 patch this vulnerability and return a trap to the guest instead of panicking. There are no known workarounds at this time. Embedders are encouraged to update to a patched version of Wasmtime.

Wasmtime is a runtime for WebAssembly. Starting in version 29.0.0 and prior to version 36.0.5, 40.0.3, and 41.0.1, on x86-64 platforms with AVX, Wasmtime's compilation of the `f64.copysign` WebAssembly instruction with Cranelift may load 8 more bytes than is necessary. When signals-based-traps are disabled this can result in a uncaught segfault due to loading from unmapped guard pages. With guard pages disabled it's possible for out-of-sandbox data to be loaded, but unless there is another bug in Cranelift this data is not visible to WebAssembly guests. Wasmtime 36.0.5, 40.0.3, and 41.0.1 have been released to fix this issue. Users are recommended to upgrade to the patched versions of Wasmtime. Other affected versions are not patched and users should updated to supported major version instead. This bug can be worked around by enabling signals-based-traps. While disabling guard pages can be a quick fix in some situations, it's not recommended to disabled guard pages as it is a key defense-in-depth measure of Wasmtime.