In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipc: limit next_id allocation to the valid ID range The checkpoint/restore sysctl path can request the next SysV IPC id through ids->next_id. ipc_idr_alloc() currently forwards that request to idr_alloc() with an open-ended upper bound. If the valid tail of the SysV IPC id space is full, the allocation can spill beyond ipc_mni. The returned SysV IPC id still uses the normal index encoding, so later lookup and removal can target the wrong slot. This leaves the real IDR entry behind and breaks the IDR state for the object. The bug is in ipc_idr_alloc() in the checkpoint/restore path. 1. ids->next_id is passed to: idr_alloc(&ids->ipcs_idr, new, ipcid_to_idx(next_id), 0, ...) 2. The zero upper bound makes the allocation effectively open-ended. Once the valid SysV IPC tail is occupied, idr_alloc() can spill past ipc_mni and allocate an entry beyond the valid IPC id range. 3. The new object id is still encoded with the narrower SysV IPC index width: new->id = (new->seq << ipcmni_seq_shift()) + idx 4. Later removal goes through ipc_rmid(), which uses: ipcid_to_idx(ipcp->id) That truncates the real IDR index. An object actually stored at a high index can then be removed as if it lived at a low in-range index. 5. For shared memory, shm_destroy() frees the current object anyway, but the real high IDR slot is left behind as a dangling pointer. 6. A subsequent walk of /proc/sysvipc/shm reaches the stale IDR entry and dereferences freed memory. Prevent this by bounding the requested allocation to ipc_mni so the checkpoint/restore path fails once the valid range is exhausted.

Pi is a minimal terminal coding harness. Pi before 0.79.0 loaded project-local configuration and resources from a repository's .pi directory without first asking the user to trust that repository. This included project-local extensions, which are executable TypeScript or JavaScript modules loaded into the Pi process. An attacker who controls a repository could place Pi-specific project resources in that repository. If a user then started Pi from that working tree, the project-local extension code could run with the same privileges as the local Pi process without the user having a convenient way to make a trust decision. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.79.0.

Pi is a minimal terminal coding harness. From 0.74.0 until 0.78.1, Pi HTML exports render session Markdown into a static HTML file. It did not consistently reject unsafe Markdown link and image URL schemes. In versions with scheme filtering, C0 control characters in the URL scheme could bypass the check because browsers normalize those characters before navigation. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.78.1.

Pi is a minimal terminal coding harness. From 0.74.0 until 0.78.1, Pi versions with temporary npm or git extension package installs used predictable paths under the operating system temporary directory. On Linux-based multi-user systems, a local attacker who can write to the shared temporary directory could prepare the expected package location before another user runs pi with a temporary extension package source. Pi could then load attacker-controlled extension code in the victim user's process. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.78.1.

Improperly Controlled Modification of Dynamically-Determined Object Attributes vulnerability in ash-project ash allows a user to set the value of a private action argument that is intended to be controlled only by trusted server-side code. Action arguments declared with public?: false are meant to be set internally (for example via Ash.Changeset.set_private_argument/3) and must not be settable from end-user input. When a changeset is built from a parameter map, Ash filters out private arguments, but the filtering is incomplete. In the regular changeset path (for_create, for_update, for_destroy), private arguments are stripped only when the parameter key is an atom. When the key is a binary (string), as is the case for user-supplied parameters, the private argument is kept and the user controls its value. In the atomic path (Ash.Changeset.fully_atomic_changeset/4, also reached through atomic and bulk updates), private arguments are not stripped at all, regardless of whether the key is an atom or a binary. An attacker who can submit parameters to an action that defines a private argument can therefore inject a value for that argument. Depending on how the application uses the argument (for example an acting_user_id driving authorization or record ownership), this can lead to an integrity violation or privilege escalation. This issue affects ash: from 3.0.0 before 3.29.3.

Inefficient algorithmic complexity in Plug's nested-parameter decoder allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to cause denial of service. Plug.Conn.Query.decode/4 (and Plug.Conn.Query.decode_each/2) parse query strings and application/x-www-form-urlencoded request bodies. When a key contains many bracketed segments such as a[a][a][a]=1, the decoder walks the brackets and, for each of the N levels, performs a map operation keyed on an ever-growing binary prefix of the key, hashing the full byte range at each step. The total decode cost is therefore quadratic in the number of nesting levels. With the default Plug.Parsers.URLENCODED body limit of 1,000,000 bytes, a single request can carry roughly 333,000 nesting levels and saturate a BEAM scheduler for minutes. A small number of concurrent requests can saturate all schedulers and render a Plug-based server unresponsive. No authentication or knowledge of application routes is required. This vulnerability is associated with program files lib/plug/conn/query.ex and program routines Plug.Conn.Query.decode/4, Plug.Conn.Query.decode_each/2, Plug.Conn.Query.split_keys/6, Plug.Conn.Query.insert_keys/3, and Plug.Conn.Query.finalize_pointer/2. This issue affects plug from 1.15.0 before 1.15.5, 1.16.4, 1.17.2, 1.18.3, and 1.19.3.

Pi is a minimal terminal coding harness. From 0.74.0 until 0.78.1, Pi stored API keys and OAuth credentials in auth.json. A race condition in the file write path could briefly create or rewrite this file with permissions derived from the process umask before tightening the file to owner-only permissions. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.78.1.

In OpenStack Swift before 2.37.2, proxy-server does not strip internal update headers (X-Container-Host, X-Container-Device, X-Delete-At-Host, X-Delete-At-Device) from client requests before forwarding them to object-servers. An authenticated user with write access can inject these headers to redirect container update requests to an attacker-controlled server, enabling server-side request forgery. The SSRF requests expose internal cluster metadata including storage policy indexes, partition mappings, device names, and when at rest encryption is enabled, cipher text and initialization vectors for the container-level encryption key. The attacker can also cause "ghost listings" in arbitrary containers via the shard-range redirect mechanism.

Home Assistant is open source home automation software that puts local control and privacy first. Prior to 2026.6.0, the Konnected integration registers an HTTP endpoint, KonnectedView (homeassistant/components/konnected/__init__.py), that is marked as not requiring authentication (requires_auth = False). A comment next to that line says auth is instead handled "via the access token from configuration." That promise is only half true. Write requests (POST and PUT) are handled by update_sensor(), which does check the request's Authorization: Bearer <token> header against the integration's stored access tokens (using hmac.compare_digest). Read requests (GET) are handled by a separate get() method that has no authentication check at all. This vulnerability is fixed in 2026.6.0.

Home Assistant is open source home automation software that puts local control and privacy first. Prior to 2026.5.3, the LocationSensorManager BroadcastReceiver is exported with no permission. Any installed app, with zero runtime permissions, can broadcast a forged Google Play Services LocationResult directly to it; the receiver trusts the extra and forwards it to the user's Home Assistant server as the device's real location. This bypasses Android's developer-mode "Mock Location" gate and allows a local malicious app to drive zone-based automations (unlock door / disarm alarm / open garage) by faking the user's GPS position. This vulnerability is fixed in 2026.5.3.